Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2

Article 3

3-1-1995

Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public
Entities Under Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, but
Are the Remedies the Same?
Cheryl L. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Disability Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
Recommended Citation
Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public Entities Under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act: A Rose
by Any Other Name, but Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. Pub. L. 235 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol9/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public
Entities Under Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, but Are
the Remedies the Same?
Cheryl L. Anderson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990 the United States Congress passed perhaps the most
monumental piece of civil rights legislation since the 1960s, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1 Since passage of the ADA,
there has been a steady stream of scholarship discussing the impact of the
act and its anticipated interpretation. 2
The majority of the focus on the ADA has been on two parts of the
act-Title I, which applies to disability discrimination in employment, 3
and Title III, which applies to commercial facilities and places of public
accommodation. 4 Virtually ignored in the shuffle has been Title II, which

* Copyright <!I> 1995 Cheryl L. Anderson. Abraham L. Freedman Fellow and Lecturer
in Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A. 1985, University of North Dakota; J.D.
1988, University of North Dakota.
I would like to thank Professors Marcia O'Kelly, Richard Greenstein, and Janet Jacobsen,
Esq., for reading earlier drafts of this Article and offering their incisive criticism and
comments. Thanks are also due Sean Park (J.D. 1995, Temple University School of Law) for
his research assistance.
I. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992)).
2. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act Symposium: A View from the Inside, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. IV 1992). Title I is expressly limited to disability
discrimination in employment. !d. § 12112(a). Section 12112(a) provides that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." !d. A "covered entity" may be "an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." !d. § 12111(2). The
definition of "employer" does not distinguish between public or private employers. See id.
§ 12111(5). For a discussion of the threshold size requirement to be a "covered entity" and
varying effective dates under Title I, see infra note 17.
4. !d. §§ 12181-12189. Title III requires private businesses to provide accessibility to
"places of public accommodation" and "commercial facilities." See id. § 12182 (prohibiting
discrimination based on disability by public accommodations); id. § 12183 (requiring that all
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which prohibits discrimination by "public entities" such as state or local
governments, their departments and agencies. 5
Title II was modeled in large part on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 6 which prohibits discrimination based, on disability
by recipients of federal financial assistance. 7 Title II was primarily
enacted to extend this prohibition "to all programs, activities, and
services provided or made available by state and local governments or
instrumentalities or agencies thereto, regardless of whether or not such
entities receive federal financial assistance. " 8 As such, the language in

new construction and alterations in public accommodations and commercial facilities be readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities); see also id. § 12181(6) (defining
private entity as any entity other than a public entity as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)).
"Public accommodation" is defined to include twelve specific types of private entities. See id.
§ 12181(7) (defining "public accommodation" to include, among others, such businesses as
restaurants, shopping centers, parks, schools, and health clubs). The term "commercial
facilities" includes facilities whose operations affect commerce, and are "intended for
nonresidential use," but does not include certain railroad operations and facilities or facilities
covered by or expressly exempted from the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. §§ 36013616). ld. § 12181(2).
5. ld. § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination by public entities); id. § 12131(1)(A), (B)
(defining public entities to include state and local governments, their departments, agencies,
special purpose districts, and instrumentalities). Title II broadly provides that "[s]ubject to the
provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." /d.
§ 12132.
Title II is broken down into two subsections. The first section is entitled "Part
A-Prohibition Against Discrimination and Other Generally Applicable Provisions," and
contains general definitions, the broad prohibition against discrimination by public entities, and
enforcement provisions. See id. §§ 12131-12134. The second subsection, entitled "Part
B-Actions Applicable to Public Transportation Provided by Public Entities Considered
Discriminatory," operates primarily to define what is discrimination in various forms of public
transportation. See id. §§ 12141-12165. The remainder of Title II is implemented through
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice. See id. § 12134(a); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35
(1993).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
7. This section provides as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
ld. When the ADA was enacted, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibited discrimination
against any "otherwise qualified individual with handicaps." See Pub. L. No. 99-506, tit. I,
§ 103(d)(2)(B), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986). In 1992 Congress amended this section so that
it now conforms with the terminology used in the ADA. See Pub. L. No. 102-569, tit. V,
§ 506, 106 Stat. 4344, 4428 (1992).
8. H.R. REP. No. 485(II), lOist Cong., 2d Sess., at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S. C. C.A. N. 303, 366. Section 504 of the Rehab it itation Act prohibits discrimination based
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Title II prohibiting disability discrimination greatly resembles that
contained in section 504, 9 and the regulations implementing Title II are
substantively similar to those implementing section 504. 10
Perhaps Title II has seen little of the spotlight to date because
Congress characterized it as "simply" extending the coverage of section
504 to all actions of state and local government. 11 This characterization

upon disability "under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. IV 1992). In contrast, Title II more broadly prohibits
discrimination based upon disability by "public entities." See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV
1992).
9. See supra notes 5, 7. However, in addition to Title Il's deletion of references to
federal financial assistance, there are a few differences between the two statutes which should
be mentioned. Section 504 also applies to programs and activities conducted by the Executive
branch of the federal government and the United States Postal Service. See 29 U .S.C. § 794(a)
(Supp. IV 1992). This language was not included in Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp.
IV 1992). Title II, therefore, does not provide for a cause of action against the federal
government or its agencies for discrimination on the basis of disability. Cf Doe v. Attorney
Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that claimant had right of action against
Department of Justice and FBI under § 504 because Congress expressly included federal
agencies within the scope of that statute).
In addition, Title II does not contain the word "solely" as in the phrase "solely by reason
of her or his disability" found in § 504. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV 1992)
(prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities "by reason of such
disability") with 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting discrimination against a
qualified individual "solely by reason of his or her disability"). However, the legislative
history of Title II reflects that Congress did not view this as a significant difference between
the two statutes, because§ 504 has not been interpreted as narrowly as that language suggests.
See H.R. REP. No. 485(II) at 85-86, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 367-69 (recognizing,
in a discussion of the overlap between Title II and § 504, that § 504 was not limited to those
cases in which the plaintiff could prove discrimination based "solely" on disability, because
such an interpretation would lead to absurd results).
10. See 28 C.P.R. pt. 35 (1993). In fact, the Department of Justice has expressly stated
that it took "major portions" of the regulations from the existing regulations implementing
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)
(Supp. IV 1992) (directing Department of Justice to adopt regulations consistent with § 504
coordination regulations adopted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 28
C. F. R. pt. 41 for recipients of federal financial assistance, except for those provisions relating
to program accessibility for existing facilities and communications, which are to be consistent
with 28 C.P.R. pt. 39).
Beeause Title II does not displace the existing jurisdiction of funding agencies under§ 504,
regulations setting out procedures for handling claims with overlapping jurisdiction have also
been produced. See 28 C.P.R. § 35.17l(a)(3)(i) (1993) (giving§ 504 agencies jurisdiction to
process complaints that fall under both § 504 and Title II); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 14,630-31
(1992) (to be codified at 28 C.P.R. pt. 37) (proposed April21, 1992) (coordination regulations
setting forth procedures governing the processing of complaints that fall under § 504 and Title
I of the ADA, including claims that also fall under Title II of the ADA).
II. The House of Representatives Committee Report reflects that the Committee "[chose]
not to list all types of actions that are included within the term 'discrimination' [under Title II],
as was done in Titles I and III, because this title essentially simply extends the antidiscrimination prohibition embodied in§ 504 Lofthe Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state
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is substantially misplaced because Title II has potentially the broadest
reach of any disability discrimination law enacted to date. Title II
imposes federal mandates on the day-to-day operation of local governments, regardless of whether federal funds have been provided to support
those operations, and regardless of the size of the entity. 12 Therefore,
citizens of even the smallest local communities may ultimately pay for
compliance with Title II with their tax dollars. 13 This represents a
substantial change from the voluntary nature of the "if you take our
money, you will follow our rules" relationship which gives rise to section
504 obligations. 14
Because Title II potentially impacts all taxpayers, its scope is also
broader than either Titles I or III of the ADA, which primarily impact the

and local governments." H.R. REP. No. 485(11), JOist Cong., 2d Sess., at 84 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
12. Neither Title II nor § 504 delimits its coverage based on the size of the entity. In
contrast, in order to be a covered entity under Title I of the ADA, an employer must have
fifteen employees or more. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); see also infra note 17.
Therefore, while some smaller employers are not subject to the employment discrimination
mandates of Title I, all local governments are subject to the mandates of Title II even if they
would otherwise not be a covered entity under Title I.
13. See John J. Coleman III & MarcelL. Debruge, A Practitioner's Introduction to ADA
Title II, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 56 (1993) (noting that much has been written on the impact of
Titles I and III on the private sector, despite the fact that Title II can have direct impact on the
amount of tax dollars that property owners pay). The ADA has been mentioned prominently
by state and local community officials in recent protests of "unfunded federal mandates" which
impose affirmative burdens on local governments but do not provide financial assistance to
meet those burdens. See, e.g., Gary Lee, Costly Federal Mandates Spur Protest; States,
Counties Seek Relieffrom Programs Imposed Without Funding, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1993,
at A3 (reporting that a coalition of state and local officials launched a protest against "unfunded
federal mandates" that included the ADA); Will Hacker, Village to Fight Against Unfunded
U.S. Mandates, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1993, Southwest Section, at 3 (reporting that a local
community will aid national groups in fighting unfunded federal mandates, with the potential
impact of ADA on decision to expand the local Village Hall specifically noted). At the time
this Article was written, the 104th Congress was considering the "Unfunded Mandate Reform
Act," which would limit the ability of Congress to pass legislation imposing such unfunded
mandates. However, this legislation specifically excludes anti-discrimination laws such as the
ADA. S. 1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995); H.R. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995).
A recent example of the impact that Title II can have on community coffers is found in
Kroll v. Saint Charles County, Mo., 766 F. Supp. 744, 753 (9th Cir. 1991), in which a county
was required to demolish and rebuild three government buildings because they were not in
compliance with the ADA and could not feasibly be renovated to bring them into compliance.
After the county attempted to pay for this work through a special sales tax, which was defeated
by the voters, the presiding federal judge gave the county two months to find the funding or
the judge would "consider imposition of [the) sales tax." Id. at 753; see also Coleman &
Debruge, supra note 13, at 55 (discussing Kroll).
14. Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1), 451 U.S. 1, 11, 1617 ( 1981) (describing the voluntary nature of the obligations assumed by states when accepting
funding under federal spending power legislation). For further discussion of Pennhurst, see
infra notes 72, 227.
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private sector. 15 Nevertheless, Title II is substantively similar to both
of these titles. 16 This similarity is best shown by Title II's incorporation
of the substantive employment discrimination provisions of Title I of the
ADAY In fact, Congress recently amended section 504 to also
incorporate the same substantive employment discrimination standards
which are applicable to Title 1. 18 In other words, regardless of whether
the coverage falls under Title I, Title II, or section 504, employment
discrimination based on disability is now governed by Title I substantive
standards.

15. See Coleman & Debruge, supra note 13, at 56. Title III is expressly limited to the
private sector and only applies to certain facilities. See supra note 4. Title I is not limited to
the private sector, and, in fact, public entities with more than fifteen employees will be subject
to both Titles I and II. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (Supp. IV 1992); see also infra note 17. Title
I is, however, limited to employment, whereas Title II applies to employment, facilities,
communication, transportation, and many other aspects of the day-to-day operation of public
entities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV 1992) (general prohibition of discrimination);
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1993) (general prohibitions against discrimination); id. § 35.149
(prohibition of discrimination in program accessibility); see also supra note 3.
16. The substantive similarity between Title I and Title II comes through Title II's
incorporation of Title I's substantive standards regarding discrimination based on disability in
employment. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1993); see infra note 17. The substantive similarity
between Title II and Title III relates to accessibility standards. Under both Title II and Title
III, facilities must be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring under Title III that all new
construction be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities); id.
§ 12183(a)(2) (requiring under Title III that alterations in existing facilities also be done in
manner making them readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities); 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35.150(a) (1993) (requiring under Title II that public entity must operate each service,
program, or activity in an existing facility in a manner that, when viewed as a whole, the
program, service or activity is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities);
see generally Coleman & Debruge, supra note 13, at 86-90 (outlining Title II program
accessibility requirements); RobertL. Burgdorf, Jr., "Equal Members ofthe Community": The
Public Accommodations Provisions of the Ameticans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. Q. 551
(1991) (outlining Title III accessibility requirements).
17. Although Title II lacks any independent substantive provisions specifically addressing
employment discrimination, such discrimination falls within the title's broad prohibition against
discrimination. Ethridge v. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903, 905-06 (M.D. Ala. 1993). The
employment discrimination regulations adopted for Title II defer to two sources-Title I of the
ADA and§ 504. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1993). To the extent that employment discrimination
claims are subject to jurisdiction under Title I, Title I standards apply. /d. § 35.140(b)(1). If
there is no Title I jurisdiction, § 504 standards apply. /d. § 35.140(b)(2). In order for Title
I jurisdiction to apply, the employer involved must employ more than a threshold number of
employees, which is currently fifteen. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). For claims
which arose after the effective date of Title I, July 26, 1992, but before July 26, 1994, the
threshold amount of employees was twenty-five. /d.; Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat.
337 (1990).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d} (Supp. IV 1992). Section 794(d) provides that "[t]he standards
used to determine whether this section has been violated ... shall be the standards applied
under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ... as such sections relate to
employment."

240

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

Despite this overlap of substantive standards, these statutes prescribe
different remedies for intentional discrimination. 19 Remedies under Title
I are determined by reference to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196420 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 21 whereas remedies under
section 504 are determined by reference to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 22 Therefore, although both statutes now allow compensatory and equitable relief, remedies under Title VII are defined and limited

19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. This Article addresses only remedies
for intentional discrimination. Title II will likely also be interpreted to prohibit disparate
impact, or "unintentional," discrimination. Unlike the remedies for intentional discrimination,
remedies for disparate impact discrimination are fairly consistent among the various federal
statutes, and are limited to equitable relief such as backpay, reinstatement (when appropriate),
and injunctions. For example, Congress has limited remedies for violation of Title I of the
ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to equitable remedies, unless the alleged
violation was based on intentional discriminatory treatment of the claimant. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 198la(a)( 1) (Supp. IV 1992) (excluding cases involving disparate impact discrimination from
provisions allowing compensatory relief for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); id. § 198la(a)(2) (excluding cases involving disparate impact discrimination from
provisions allowing compensatory relief for violation of Title I of the ADA); id. § 2000e-5(g)
(authorizing backpay, reinstatement, and injunctive relief in disparate impact and disparate
treatment actions). The United States Supreme Court has similarly interpreted Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination
based on race. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463
U.S. 582 (1983). While arguments have been raised for expanding disparate impact
discrimination remedies to make them similar to intentional discrimination remedies, this is not
likely to happen in the near future. See John D. Biggs, Safeguarding Equality for the
Handicapped: Compensatory ReliefUnder Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 197 (1986) (arguing that compensatory relief should be available for any violation of
§ 504).
20. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000h (1970)). In particular, Title I of the ADA incorporates the provision of Title
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provides for equitable remedies, including injunctive
relief, reinstatement, and backpay, for persons who have suffered discrimination in
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. IV 1992)(incorporating42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
21. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eand 1981). The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 expanded the remedies available under Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 beyond equitable remedies, to now include compensatory and punitive
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV 1992); see also infra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2) (1988) (incorporating the remedies, rights and procedures set
forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U .S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7)). The
remedial standards applicable to Title VI are discussed in detail in part II of this Article infra
notes 31-129 and accompanying text. The recent amendment to § 504 should not affect
enforcement standards under that section, because the new subsection only refers to "the
standards used to determine whether this section [§ 504] has been violated." !d. § 794(d)
(Supp. IV 1992). Enforcement of§ 504 is governed by a separate section of the Rehabilitation
act. See id. § 794a(a)(2) (1988); see also notes 35-39 and accompanying text discussing
Rehabilitation Act enforcement standards; cf Petersen v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of
Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.O. Wis. 1993) (Title II adopts only the substantive
provisions of Title I, not the procedural requirements).
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by statute, whereas remedies under Title VI are governed by a commonlaw presumption in favor of "any appropriate relief. " 23
Unfortunately, Title II contains an ambiguous enforcement provision
which can be read to refer to either of these two different standards, or
both. 24 How this ambiguity is resolved will determine whether Title II
remedies are consistent with Title I remedies in situations in which
similar substantive standards are applied. 25 Regardless of how this
ambiguity is resolved, however, remedies under Title II and Title III for
similar substantive violations will be quite different because Title III
remedies are expressly limited to equitable relief in any private cause of
action under that title. 26
Part II of this Article addresses the two remedial standards referred
to in Title II and concludes that Title II incorporates the same remedial
standard for intentional discrimination as section 504, namely the "any
appropriate relief' standard. 27 Part III examines what the "any appropriate relief' standard means in the context of Title II and concludes that
compensatory and equitable relief as well as attorney's fees may be
recovered, but punitive damages may not be. 28 Part IV then addresses
the anomaly created by Title II's incorporation of the "any appropriate
relief' standard: the fact that acts of intentional disability discrimination
subject to similar substantive standards will result in different remedies,
depending on which title of the ADA is applied. 29 Finally, Part V
suggests that in order to fix this anomaly, it is necessary to equalize the
remedial standards for similar acts of intentional discrimination. 30

23. See discussion infra part II.
24. See 42 U .S.C. § 12133 (Supp. IV 1992). For a detailed discussion of this statute,
the ambiguity inherent in it, and the remedial standard that Congress apparently intended to be
applied, see infra part II of this Article, notes 31-129.
25. See infra notes 233-72 and accompanying text.
26. Title III expressly incorporates the remedies available under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988), in any private cause of action by
a person aggrieved by a violation of Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
Remedies are limited to equitable, non-monetary relief. ld. § 2000a-3; see also Mayberry v.
von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160,1167 (S.D. Mich. 1994) (holdingthatprivateplaintiffunder
Title III is not entitled to monetary damages). The United States Attorney General has
authority to bring a lawsuit if there is "reasonable cause to believe that there has been a pattern
or practice of discrimination or that an alleged instance of discrimination raises an issue of
general public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). In any such suit,
the available remedies are broader, and include compensatory (but not punitive) damages. /d.
§ 12188(2). As will be discussed in the following part, there is no similar limitation in Title
II on a private claimant's ability to obtain compensatory relief. See generally infra part II.
27. This includes employment discrimination claims that would be subject to overlapping
jurisdiction under Title I. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
29. See infra part IV.
30. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
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WHAT Is THE REMEDIAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE II?

The enforcement section of Title II provides that "[t]he remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation Ace 1
shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this title provides to any
person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of
section 202. " 32 Although this appears to clearly endorse private
enforcement of Title II, 33 it unfortunately also creates an inherent
ambiguity. Section 505 contains two separate and very different
standards for the awarding of damages. 34

31. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988). The enforcement provisions of§ 505 were not added to
the Rehabilitation Act until 1978. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I,§ 102(a), 92 Stat.
2955, 2982-83 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988)); see also infra note 34.
32. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 203, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134).
33. It is now generally accepted that there is an implied private cause of action to enforce
the Rehabilitation Act. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1380
(lOth Cir. 1981) (holding that private cause of action may be maintained under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act); cf Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,636 (1984) (holding
that individual alleging violation of§ 504 may recover backpay from employer). See generally
Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some Initial
Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST. Lours U. PuB. L. REV. 185 (1992)
(tracing history of enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988). Section 794a provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a)(l) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16), including the application of sections 706(f)
through 706(k) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) through (k)), shall be available, with respect
to any complaint under section 791 of this title, to any employee or applicant for
employment aggrieved by the final disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to
take final action on such complaint ....
(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S. C. 2000d et seq.) shall be available to any person aggrieved by any
act of failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such
assistance under section 794 of this title.
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
When it was first adopted, the Rehabilitation Act did not contain any procedures for
enforcement. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 355-94. In 1978,
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act and added § 505. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I,
§ 102(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982-83 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988)).
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Subsection (a)(l) of section 50535 establishes the remedies available
for violation of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 36 which are the
rights, remedies, and procedures available under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 37 On the other hand, subsection (a)(2) of section
50538 establishes the remedies available for violation of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, which are the rights, remedies, and procedures
available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 39
One court has suggested that the failure of Congress to differentiate
in Title II between these two subparts of section 505 indicates that the
remedies afforded under Titles VI and VII are coextensive. 40 However,
as discussed below, this is not the case. 41 Accordingly, because Title
II fails to distinguish between these two subparts of section 505, the
enforcement provisions of Title II are ambiguous. 42
A.

The 1Wo Damages Standards Under Titles VII and VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964

Title VII remedies are specifically set forth in the pertinent statutes.43 In contrast, Title VI remedies are established by case law, and
the full extent of those remedies has not yet been clearly defined. 44

35. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l).
36. ld. § 791 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 50! requires affirmative action in
employment by federal executive agencies.
37. ld. § 794a(a)(l) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t) through (k) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
sex and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). As previously discussed, Title I of
the ADA also incorporates the remedial provisions of Title VII. See supra notes 20-21.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7).
39. /d. (incorporating 42 U.S. C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7). Title VI prohibits discrimination
on the grounds of race, color or national origin in progrants and activities conducted by
recipients of federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). For a discussion of the
relationship between § 504 and Title VI, see infra note 56.
40. See Rivera Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 70 (D. Puerto Rico
1991). The court in Rivera Flores concluded that Title VI remedies were limited to the type
of equitable remedies available at that time under Title VII. /d. at 71 (holding that the
prevailing plaintiff under Title VI is entitled to injunctive relief, backpay, and attorney's fees,
but not compensatory relief for mental suffering).
41. See discussion infra part II.A.
42. Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 483 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (noting that§ 12133
is ambiguous because it fails to distinguish between § 794(a)( 1) and § 794(a)(2), each of which
incorporates different rights, procedures, and remedies).
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992).
44. See infra notes 52-102 and accompanying text.
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Title Vll remedies

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination based upon race, religion, sex, or national origin. 45 Until
1991, recovery under Title VII was limited to equitable remedies, which
essentially meant backpay, reinstatement, and injunctive relief. 46 In
1991, Congress passed a new civil rights act which expanded the
remedies available for intentional discrimination in employment. 47
Compensatory damages are now available48 as well as punitive damages
in some circumstances, 49 but the total amount of damages recoverable
are capped depending upon the number of persons employed by the
employer, with an ultimate limit of $300,000. 50 The complainant is still
also entitled to those equitable remedies previously recoverable under
Title VII. 51
2.

Title VI remedies

Title VI provides that "[n]o person shall, on the ground of race,
color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

45. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
46. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(Supp. IV 1992); see also Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d
1355, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1982) (outlining reasons why courts have denied compensatory
damages in Title VII cases).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I,§ 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 107273 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198la (Supp. IV 1992)).
48. 42 U .S.C. § 198la(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV 1992). Compensatory damages may include
future pecuniary loss, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary losses. ld. § 198la(b)(3).
49. Punitive damages may be awarded if the plaintiff can show malice or reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's federally protected rights, but may not be awarded against a
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 42 U.S. C. § 198la(b )( 1) (Supp. IV
1992).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). If the employer has more than 14 and
fewer than 101 employees during each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
proceeding calendar year, the most that the plaintiff can recover in compensatory damages is
$50,000. ld. The scale increases to $100,000 for employers with more than 100 and less than
201 employees, $200,000 for employers with more than 200 employees but less than 501
employees, and $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. ld. If any punitive
damages are awarded, this amount must be added to any compensatory award, and the total
cannot exceed the limit for that employer. ld.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV 1992). The United States Supreme Court
has recently ruled that the damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are not
retroactive from the effective date of the act, November 21, 1991. Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1994). Therefore, monetary relief is only available for those
claims which arose after that date.
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The remedies
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. " 52
available for violation of Title VI have been developed through convolution of statutes and court decisions.
a. Supreme Court precedent. The United States Supreme Court
has not specifically decided what damages are recoverable under Title VI
for intentional discrimination. 53 The Court has, however, recently
addressed this issue in a case involving a similar statute, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. 54 Title IX prohibits sexual discrimination in educational programs which receive federal funding. 55 It has
been generally accepted that Title IX is patterned after Title VI, and
"analysis of the two statutes is substantially the same. " 56
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 57 the Supreme
Court held that the trial court, in a private cause of action by an
aggrieved person/8 had the power to award "any appropriate relief' to
the prevailing plaintiff in a Title IX action. 59 The plaintiff in Franklin
alleged that while she was a student at North Gwinnett High School in
Gwinnett County, Georgia, she was subjected to continual sexual

52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
53. The Court did address Title VI remedies in a badly fragmented 1982 decision,
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1982), in
which the opinion of the court was limited to a finding that compensatory damages are not
available for unintentional discrimination under Title VI. See infra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text. The Court has not directly addressed the scope of damages for intentional
discrimination under Title VI.
54. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (interpreting Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688)).
55. Title IX provides in pertinent part that no person "shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C.
§ 168l(a) (1988).
56. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 619 (lith Cir. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see also Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 594 (noting that
Title IX was derived from Title VI and Congress intended remedies under these two statutes
to be similar).
The same is true of § 504. The legislative history of § 504 reflects that Congress
explicitly patterned § 504 after Title VI. SeeS. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 39-40,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390 (stating that § 504 was patterned after and is
almost identical to Title VI).
57. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
58. The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that Title IX was enforceable through an
implied private right of action by an aggrieved party. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979). This did not resolve the issue presented in Franklin, however, because
as the Court in Franklin noted, the question of what remedies are available under a statute that
provides a private right of action is "analytically distinct" from the issue of whether a right
exists in the first place. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979)). The decision in Cannon, therefore, resolved only the latter issue of whether a private
right of action existed, and left open the issue of what damages could be recovered. /d.
59. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.
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harassment by a sports coach and teacher employed by the district. 60
The lower court concluded that compensatory damages were not available
under Title IX, regardless of whether plaintiff proved intentional
discrimination because Title IX was to be narrowly construed to provide
only equitable relief. 61
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating broadly that it would "presume
the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly
indicated otherwise. " 62 The Court reaffirmed the common-law principle
it had previously set forth in Bell v. Hood, 63 that "where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done. " 64

60. /d. at 63-64. The alleged sexual harassment of the plaintiff, Franklin, allegedly
occurred starting when she was in tenth grade in 1986 and apparently continued until some time
in 1988. /d. Franklin also alleged that teachers and administrators at the school became aware
of the harassment and conducted an investigation of the teacher's actions, but failed to take any
action to stop the harassment and encouraged Franklin not to press charges against the teacher.
/d.
61. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503
U.S. 60 ( 1992). The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Guardians Ass 'n as leaving open the question
of whether compensatory damages were available for intentional violations of Title VI. 911
F.2d at 621. The court reasoned that the plurality opinion in Guardians Ass 'n emphasized that
relief under statutes such as Title VI and Title IX, which are enacted pursuant to Congress's
Spending Clause powers, must be carefully defined to respect the right of the recipient of the
federal funding to limit the exposure incurred with the receipt of the funds. /d. (citing
Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 3229-31); see U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. The Eleventh
Circuit further reasoned that Guardians Ass 'n did not overrule a pre-Guardians Ass 'n case
which held that the only available remedies were declaratory and injunctive relief designed to
eliminate the discriminatory activity. Franklin, 911 F .2d at 622 (citing Drayden v. Needville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981)). The court concluded that it
must "proceed with extreme care, where Congress has not expressly provided such a remedy
as a part of the statutory scheme, where the Supreme Court has not spoken clearly, and where
binding precedent in this circuit is contrary." ld.
62. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
63. 327 u.s. 678 (1946).
64. Bell, 327 U.S. at 684; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66. The Franklin Court noted that this
rule had its roots in English common law. /d. (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES
23 (1783)). The Court also noted that the presumption had a long history of application in the
Court's own jurisprudence. /d. The Court rejected an argument by the respondents and the
United States as amicus curiae that it had backed away from this principle in succeeding cases,
particularly in Guardians Ass 'nand Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66-71. In regard to Guardians Ass'n, the Court stated that "a clear
majority [of Justices] expressed the view that damages were available under Title VI in an
action seeking remedies for an intentional violation, and no Justice challenged the traditional
presumption in favor of a federal court's power to award appropriate relief .... " /d. at 70.
The Court made the same observation about Varrone, a case in which a unanimous Court held
that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act authorized an award ofbackpay. /d. (citing Darrone, 465
U.S. at 630 n.9).
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Because the Court had earlier ruled that there was an implied private
cause of action under Title IX, 65 it now considered whether Congress
had expressed any intention to limit this presumption. 66 The Court
dismissed the lack of discussion of remedies in the legislative history,
noting that because this cause of action had been implied in the statute,
it was "hardly surprising" that Congress was silent on the remedies. 67
Thus, instead of focusing on the legislative history of the statute, the
Court was more concerned with the state of the law at the time the
legislation was passed, 68 as well as with the amendments to the statute
that were passed after the Court's decision that the statute permitted an
implied cause of action. 69 The Court reasoned that these amendments
evidenced no intent to limit available remedies, but rather, if anything,
broadened the coverage of Title IX and related anti-discrimination
statutes. 70
The Court in Franklin accordingly concluded that Congress did not
intend to limit the recovery available under Title IX. 71 Rather, its

65. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see also supra note 58.
66. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65-66.
67. /d. at 71. The Court in Franklin reasoned that "lb]ecause the cause of action was
inferred by the Court in Cannon, the usual recourse to statutory text and legislative history in
the period prior to that decision necessarily will not enlighten our analysis." /d. The Court
also reasoned that " [s]ince the Court in Cannon cone! uded that this statute supported no express
right of action, it is hardly surprising that Congress also said nothing about the applicable
remedies for an implied right of action." /d.
68. /d. at 71-72. The Court in Franklin again reiterated that the presumption in favor
of all available remedies was the prevailing presumption "[i]n the years before and after
Congress enacted this statute . . . . " /d.
69. /d. at 72-73. Those amendments were the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act
of 1986, 42 U .S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988), and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 abrogates the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988). The statute was enacted
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 247 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that states were immune from liability under
§ 504 because Congress had not clearly stated that state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment had been abrogated.
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amended the definition of "program or activity"
under Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634), to apply to all the operations of the recipient of federal
financial assistance, not just the part which received the federal money. Pub. L. No. I 00-259,
102 Stat. 28 (codified in scattered sections of29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). This legislation was
also in reaction to a Supreme Court opinion, Grove City Collegev. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74
(1984), in which the Court had narrowly construed Title IX to apply only to a program or
activity which received federal funds.
70. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73; see also supra note 69.
71. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.
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actions reflected an endorsement of the availability of expansive
remedies. 72
The same conclusion should apply to the question of remedies under
Title VI. In reaching its decision in Franklin, the Court expressed its
belief that its decision in a prior case, Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Commission of the City of New York, 73 was properly interpreted
as approving the same expansive remedies for violation of Title VI. 74
Although the Court delivered a badly fragmented plurality opinion in
Guardians Association, which was limited to a finding that compensatory
damages were not available to a plaintiff who could not show proof of
discriminatory intent, 75 a majority of the justices also appeared to agree

72. See id. The Court also rejected additional arguments advanced for not applying the
presumption, the most intriguing of which was that Title IX was a Spending Clause statute and
the Court had previously interpreted such statutes to require limited damages. /d. at 74 (citing
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1), 451 U.S. I, 28-29 (1981)); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also supra note 61. Justice White, who wrote the
opinion in Franklin, had previously stated in his plurality opinion in Guardians Ass 'n that
'"make whole' remedies are not ordinarily appropriate in private actions seeking relief for
violations of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to its 'power under the Spending Clause to
place conditions on the grant of federal funds."' Guardians Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 596 (quoting
Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 1).
Justice White side-stepped this issue in Franklin by distinguishing between unintentional
and intentional violations. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75. The Justice reasoned that whereas in
cases alleging unintentional violations, the point of not permitting money damages is that the
recipient of the federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award, such
concerns do not arise in cases of intentional violations. ld.
As Justice White recognized, because intentional discrimination claims involve violation
of a clearly stated mandate in the statute itself, the fund recipient can hardly be heard to argue
that it was unaware of its obligations. See id. On the other hand, disparate impact claims
often involve more subtle aspects of the statutes and regulations, which are not apparent to the
actor until some later time after the funds are received and put into use. As will be further
developed in part IV, the victims of intentional discrimination suffer similar manifestations of
harm, which supports applying a consistent remedy for intentional violations under all similar
federal anti-discrimination laws.
73. 463 u.s. 582 (1982).
74. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70 (citing Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 595). Guardians
Ass 'n involved a racial discrimination claim under Title VI brought against the City of New
York and other parties by black and Hispanic police officers, alleging that the examination
procedures of the New York City Police Department had a discriminatory impact on the
minority officers which resulted in their being laid off from the police force. Guardians Ass 'n,
463 U.S. at 585. Specifically, the minority officers alleged that the entry-level written
examinations, administered between 1968 and 1970, had a discriminatory impact on the scores
and pass-rates of blacks and Hispanics and were not job-related. ld. The class of officers
bringing suit had all passed the exam and were hired during that period through October, 1974.
/d. Because police officers were hired and given seniority in order of test scores, the minority
officers, who were then among the last hired, were disproportionately affected when a
reduction in force on a "last-hired, first-fired" basis was conducted in 1975. /d.
75. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court, concluding that Title VI reaches
unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination, but that absent proof of discriminatory intent,
the petitioners were not entitled to the relief they sought. Guardians Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 584.
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that compensatory damages would be available if intent could be
shown. 76
Further, the same subsequent legislation the Court considered
significant in Franklin also similarly expanded the scope of Title VI. 77
In light of the close relationship between Title VI and Title IX, the
Court's interpretation of Guardians Association, and the lack of any
subsequent expression of Congressional intent to limit remedies under
Title VI, there should be little question that courts may also award "any
appropriate rei ief' under Title VI. 78
b. The lower couns. Franklin should resolve a split of authority
that currently exists among the lower courts regarding whether compensatory damages can be recovered for violations of Title VI, Title IX, and
section 504, 79 as well as the scope of any such recovery. 80 Some

76. Justice White's opinion in Guardians Ass'n stated that "it may be that the victim of
intentional discrimination should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as
prospective relief." /d. at 597. Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the conclusion that Title VI
allowed actions for disparate-impact discrimination, but appeared to join in that portion of
White's opinion which stated that compensatory damages would likely be available in
intentional discrimination cases. /d. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated his conclusion that compensatory damages were
available under Title VI regardless of whether the plaintiff could show proof of discriminatory
intent. /d. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, also reasoned that there was no limitation
in Title VI which would preclude an award of compensatory relief to those who could not show
discriminatory intent. /d. at 635-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
78. The holding in Franklin broadly states that "a damages remedy is available for an
action brought to enforce Title IX," and does not expressly limit this rule only to cases of
intentional discrimination. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. Nonetheless, given the fact that Franklin
clearly involved a claim of intentional discrimination, in the form of sexual harassment, and
the Court's interpretation of its prior Spending Clause rulings as limiting remedies in claims
based on unintentional discrimination, the Court's ruling in Franklin can only reasonably be
interpreted as limited to cases of intentional discrimination.
79. For a discussion of the interrelationship of these statutes, see supra note 56.
80. Courts disagreed as to whether compensatory damages were available under either
Title VI or Title IX. Compare Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Bd., 917 F.2d 779, 788-89
(3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that compensatory damages are available under Title IX) and Craft
v. Board of Trustees, 793 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986)
(stating that "granting of compensatory relief under § 2000d [Title VI] requires proof of
discriminatory intent") with Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (lith Cir.
1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that compensatory damages are not available under
Title IX) and Drayden v. Needville lndep. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. Unit A
Apr. 1981) (holding that compensatory damages are not available under Title VI).
There was a similar split of authority regarding § 504. Compare Greater Los Angeles
Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F .2d 1103 , 1107 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that
compensatory damages are available as a remedy under § 504) and Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982) (holding that damages are
available under § 504 in a case in which plaintiff sought compensatory relief) with Eastman v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 939 F.2d 204, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the reference to
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81
courts limited recovery outright to declaratory and injunctive relief.
Other courts achieved the same effect by recognizing a right to recover
compensatory damages, but then concluded that for purposes of federal
discrimination law, this did not include non-pecuniary relief for such
things as emotional distress and pain and suffering. 82 Still other courts
permitted recovery of compensatory damages without any apparent limitation.83
Of these various decisions, those which limited relief to equitable
remedies are most clearly called into question by Franklin. 84 The
decisions which refused non-pecuniary relief such as emotional distress
should also be overruled by the "any appropriate relief' standard adopted
in Franklin.
A number of courts which concluded that only limited damages were
available under these statutes did so by analogizing Title VI remedies to
Title VII remedies. 85 For example, in Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic

"compensatory" relief in Guardians Ass 'n to be limited to only equitable monetary relief of the
type available under Title VII); see also Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589
F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (concluding that § 504 plaintiff is entitled to "full
panoply of remedies," which presumptively includes punitive damages).
81. See, e.g., Turnerv. First Hosp. Corp. of Norfolk, 772 F. Supp. 284,288 (E. D. Va.
1991) (holding that plaintiff in § 504 action can recover equitable remedies including backpay,
reinstatement, and loss of job benefits such as insurance, but cannot recover compensatory
damages such as mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, or pain and suffering); Ruth
Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 473 (S.D. Texas 1982) (holding that
remedies under § 504 are limited to injunctive and declaratory relief).
82. See, e.g., Eastman, 939 F.2d at 207 (interpreting Guardians Ass 'n 's reference to
compensatory damages as limited to only equitable monetary relief similar to that available
under Title VII); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35, 37 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(reasoning that as used in the context of federal employment discrimination claims,
"compensatory damages" means Title VII equitable remedies, including backpay, but does not
include mental suffering and humiliation).
83. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788 (holding that plaintiff in Title IX action is entitled
to compensatory damages); Zolin, 812 F.2d at 1107 (holding that plaintiff in§ 504 action is
entitled to "full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and monetary damages"); Doe
v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that plaintiff may
recover compensatory damages under § 504); Cortes v. Board of Governors, 766 F. Supp.
623, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same).
84. See Doe, 796 F. Supp. at 572 n.14 (questioning cases which limited relief to
equitable remedies in light of Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin).
85. This includes both cases finding no right to compensatory relief and cases finding
a right to compensatory relief but limiting it to equitable-type remedies. See, e.g., Eastman,
939 F.2d at 208-09 (analogizing Title VI and Title VII to conclude that compensatory relief
under Title VI is limited to equitable remedies); Shuttleworth, 649 F. Supp. at 37-38
(analogizing § 504 and Title VII to conclude that compensatory relief under § 504 means
"equitable monetary damages similar to those recoverable under Title VII"); Turner, 772 F.
Supp. at 287 (analogizing Title VII to § 504 and Title VI to conclude that § 504 plaintiff is
limited to equitable remedies); Ruth Anne M., 532 F. Supp. at 473 (same).
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lnstitute, 86 the Fourth Circuit concluded that section 504 did not permit
an award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering because the
court was persuaded that analogy to Title VII's limitation to equitable
relief was appropriate. 87
The court in Eastman first reasoned that the term "compensatory
damages" was used in Guardians Association only in a limited sense to
describe equitable monetary relief in the form of back pay. 88 The court
then applied a "legislative-intent approach" to determine what in fact was
allowable as "compensatory damages" and concluded that Congress did
not intend section 504 and Title VI "to create a new species of statutory
torts. " 89 The court in Eastman was not deterred by the fact that Title
VII was limited to employment claims:
The scope of Title VI extends beyond the employment arena, but this
fact does not dilute the persuasive force of the Title Vll/'fitle VI
analogy. Both statutory schemes provide weapons against discriminatory practices, and the differences between the two do not argue for
distinct approaches to damages. The considerable overlap of the two,
e.g., racial discrimination claims against a federally-funded employer,
militates in favor of a basic congruity of remedies. Nothing in the
legislative history of Title VI points to any reason why the anti-discrimination statutes should not be treated similarly in this regard. 90

In addition, the court noted that at the time the Rehabilitation Act was
amended in 1978 to incorporate Title VI remedies, there was a fourteen
year track record indicating that no remedy for pain and suffering was
available under Title VJ.91
Despite the Eastman court's cogent argument for interpreting similar
anti-discrimination statutes to provide similar remedies, analogy to Title
VII remedies would now seem inappropriate. 92 The Supreme Court's

86. 939 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1991).
87. !d. at 208. The court noted that Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Guardians Ass'n,
had stated that Title VII is a useful guidepost in Title VI analysis. ld. (citing Guardian's Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 634 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
88. Eastman, 939 F.2d at 207. The court in Eastman reasoned that the term
"compensatory" was used only in discussing the distinction between retrospective relief, such
as backpay, and prospective relief, such as injunctive and declaratory relief aimed at rectifying
the discriminatory practice in the future. ld. at 206-07.
89. ld. at 208.
90. ld. at 208.
91. ld. at 209 (citations omitted).
92. Doev. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559,572 n.l4 (D.O. C. 1992). The court
in Doe reasoned that "[t]he holdong in Franklin that damages may be recovered in private
actions to enforce Title IX, and by analogy, Title VI, leads to the reasonable conclusion that
the remedies available under § 504 are not limited to equitable relief. Accordingly, after

252

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

decision in Franklin establishes that Title IX and similar statutes are
subject to a different analysis. Cases which have arisen under section
504 since Franklin reflect this. 93 However, most of these cases resolve
this issue by simply imputing Franklin to section 504 because of the
interrelationship between section 504 and Titles VI and IX. 94 Although
the analogy is appropriate, these cases fail to effect a complete application
of Franklin. A complete application of Franklin requires a separate
determination of whether Congress has expressed an intent to limit the
remedies available under the particular statute in question. 95
In Miller v. Spicer, 96 the court considered both parts of the Franklin
analysis in concluding that Franklin's general rule in favor of "all
available remedies" applied to claims arising under section 504. 97 The
court first determined that Franklin's rationale applied to section 504
because of the relationship among section 504, Title VI, and Title IX. 98

Franklin, it appears that the analogy to Title VII remedies was misplaced." /d. (citation
omitted).
93. See Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 168 (D. Del. 1993); Kraft v. Memorial
Medical Ctr. Inc., 807 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (S.D. Ga. 1992); Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807
F. Supp. 701,704-05 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Doev. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559,571
(D.D.C. 1992); Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970, 973 (D. Colo. 1992).
94. See, e.g., Doe, 796 F. Supp. 559,572 (D.D.C. 1992) (concludingthatthe reasoning
of Franklin is applicable by analogy to Title VI and, therefore, equally applicable to § 504,
thereby permitting award of compensatory damages, including emotional pain and suffering);
Kraft, 807 F. Supp. at 792 (noting that courts which have addressed this issue subsequent to
Franklin agree that compensatory damages are available under Title VI and, accordingly,
§ 504); Tanberg, 787 F. Supp. at 973 (holding that compensatory damages are available under
§ 504 based on Court's ruling in Franklin that such damages are appropriate to redress injuries
caused by intentional discrimination).
95. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,70-71,75-76 (1992); see
also supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. After first stating that it continued to apply the
common-law presumption which authorized any appropriate remedy, the Court then stated that
a clear majority of justices in Guardians Ass 'n expressed a view that damages were available
under Title VI. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66-68, 70. If the relationship between these federal
statutes were all that is necessary in order to resolve the issue of remedies, the Court could
have simply ruled that Title IX, therefore, also permitted monetary relief. The Court did not
do this, however, and instead moved on to separately analyze whether Congress had expressed
an intent to limit the common-law presumption allowing any appropriate relief as applied to
Title IX. /d. at 75-76.
96. 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1992).
97. /d. at 168. The court in Miller divided Franklin's analysis into two parts. First, the
court considered whether the relationship between the various statutes indicated that damages
were available under § 504 for intentional discrimination. /d. at 167. Second, the court
considered whether the Supreme Court's analysis in Franklin applied to § 504 and "leads to
the same conclusion [that] money damages are available." ld. at 167-68.
98. /d. at 167. This part of the analysis was relatively straightforward. The court
reasoned that since analysis of Title VI and Title IX has developed along concurrent lines, after
the Supreme Court's holding in Franklin and its interpretation of Guardians Ass 'nit was "clear
that money damages are available for intentional violations of Title VI." /d. Because § 504
incorporates the remedies of Title VI, a similar conclusion applied to § 504. /d.
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The court in Miller then considered whether Congress had expressed
any intention to override the presumption in favor of all available
remedies with regard to section 504. 99 The court concluded that it had
not, 100 reasoning that, as with Title IX, Congress had adopted both
section 504 and subsequent legislation impacting on section 504 without
demonstrating an intent to limit any available remedy. 101 Therefore,
the presumption was not overcome and money damages were available
for intentional discrimination under section 504. 102

B.

Which Standard Applies to Title II?

Title VI and section 504 remedies are thus based on the common-law
presumption in favor of any appropriate relief. 103 Therefore, if the
rights and remedies available under Title II are those available under
section 504, which in turn are those available under Title VI, the scope
of recovery for intentional discrimination is quite broad.
On the other hand, if the rights and remedies are those available
under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which in turn are those
available under Title VII, the scope of recovery for intentional discrimination is more limited. 104 Title VII remedies are specifically set forth
in the statutes and are subject to limitations both in kind and amount. 105

99. !d. at 167-68.
100. !d. at 168.
I01. !d. Although the court in Miller did not expressly indicate to which statutes it was
referring, presumably the court meant the same two statutes discussed in Franklin, namely the
Civil Rights Equalization Amendments of 1986 and Civil Right Restoration Act of 1987, in that
these statutes also amended§ 504. See supra note 69. The Supreme Court's analysis of these
two statutes in the context of Title IX applies with equal force to § 504 because those statutes
also amended § 504 without any indication of an intent to limit the scope of recovery under that
statute. ld.; see also Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701,704-05 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(reasoning that because the remedy provisions of § 504 are silent as to appropriate relief,
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief, not limited to equitable
remedies).
102. Miller, 822 F. Supp. at 168.
103. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
104. Under this scenario, the remedies available under Title II would also be identical to
those available under Title I. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text regarding remedial
standards under Title I.
105. Available equitable relief is set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(Supp. IV 1992). See
supra note 46 and accompanying text. Available monetary relief is set out in 42 U.S.C.
§ 198la (Supp. IV 1992). See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Monetary relief is
limited in § 198la to employment discrimination, and the amount which can be recovered is
limited by the number of employees employed by the defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2),
(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992); supra notes 48 & 50. Further, no compensatory damages would be
available at all if the defendant has fourteen or fewer employees. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
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Title II's enforcement provision itself provides no basis for
differentiating between Title VI and Title VII remedies. 106 Title II
could even be interpreted to incorporate one set of remedies fur
intentional disability discrimination in employment and another set of
remedies for all other acts of disability discrimination. 107 As the
following discussion will demonstrate, however, this does not appear to
be what Congress intended. Rather, Congress intended that Title VI
remedies apply to all Title II claims through the conduit of section 504.
Congress clearly indicated that Title II was intended to be substantially similar to section 504. 108 This is reflected not only in the choice
of language in Title II, which is substantively almost identical to that in
section 504, 109 but also in the legislative history which indicates that
Title II is to be applied and enforced in a manner similar to section
504. 110
For example, although Congress did not expressly state in the statute
itself that there was a private cause of action under Title II, the legislative
history reflects that Congress presumed such cause of action was
available, and that this cause of action included section 504 rights,
remedies, and procedures:
As with section 504, there is also a private right of action for persons
with disabilities, which includes the full panoply of remedies. Again,
consistent with section 504, it is not the Committee's intent that persons
with disabilities need to exhaust Federal administrative remedies before
exercising their private right of action. 111

Similarly, Congress directed the government to use the administrative
sanctions available under section 504 to enfurce Title II, when applicable. 112

106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
108. Because the statute does not clearly indicate which section was meant to reply, the
legislative history of Title II provides valuable insight into resolution of this ambiguity. Cf
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632 n.13 (1984) (stating that language as
broad as that of§ 504 cannot be read in insolation from its legislative history).
109. See supra notes 5, 7 & 9 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
111. H.R. REP. No. 485(II), 10lst Cong., 2d Sess., at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 381.
112. See id. Specifically, the Committee indicated its "intent that administrative
enforcement of§ 202 of the legislation [42 U .S.C.§ 12132] should closely parallel the Federal
government's experience with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." /d. The committee
report further references use of "section 504 enforcement procedures and the Department's
coordination role under Executive Order 12250 as models for regulation in this area." !d. The
federal agencies charged with overseeing compliance with and investigating and resolving
complaints under § 504 would likewise handle compliance and complaints under Title II. /d.
For those cases where the fund termination procedures under§ 504 were inapplicable because

235]

INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE II

255

Because Title VII applies to employment claims, an argument might
be made that Congress was actually anticipating that the courts would
apply two different remedial standards-one for employment discrimination and one for all other claims. 113 As the passage quoted above
demonstrates, however, the legislative history reflects no such distinction.114 Congress intended the "full panoply of remedies," which
would not have been available for employment discrimination claims at
the time that the ADA was enacted. 115
Similarly, when Congress subsequently addressed remedies under the
ADA in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 116 its actions reflected an understanding that only Title I required amendment in order to provide for
compensatory relief. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically enumerates those statutes to which its damages provisions apply, and while it
specifically amended Title I, the statute makes no mention whatsoever of
Title II. 117 Indeed, if Congress had intended that Title II incorporate
Title VII remedies, it could have simply used the same language found

the state or local government entities involved do not receive federal funds, the Committee
intended that the cases be referred to the Department of Justice, which could then proceed to
file suits in federal district court. /d.
The regulations adopted by the Department of Justice incorporate these concepts. See 28
C.F .R. § 35.170-.174 (1993) (establishing administrative enforcement procedures); 28 C.P.R.
§ 35.172 app. A. The regulations do not specifically include any provisions outlining the
remedies available under Title II. In the appendix to the complaint resolution regulations,
however, the Department of Justice notes that the legislative history clearly indicates an intent
to provide the "full panoply of remedies." 28 C.P.R.§ 35.172 app. A.
113. In at least one decision to date, the court in dicta suggested that the damages
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied to a Title II employment discrimination case,
even after recognizing that Title II otherwise incorporates § 504 enforcement standards. See
Ethridgev. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903,908 n.13 (M.D. Ala. 1993). In Ethridge, the court,
after first recognizing that Title II remedies are those available under the Rehabilitation Act,
stated that the plaintiff's right to recover compensatory damages was limited by a provision in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. /d. at 908 n.13 (applying 42 U.S.C. § l981a(a)(2) (Supp. IV
1992) which prevents claimant in Title I suits from recovering compensatory damages if the
defendant employer has made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's
disability); see also G. William Davenport, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal
of the Major Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 ALA. L. REv. 307, 319
(1992) (giving hypothetical example of claim involving public entity defendant but applying
Civil Rights Act damages caps to limit amount which claimant was entitled to recover).
114. See supra note 111.
115. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing compensatory relief in actions
brought under §§ 703, 704 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2,
2000e-3, 2000e-16]); id. § 198la(a)(2) (authorizing compensatory relief in actions brought
under § 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act [42 U.S.C. § 12112] and § 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 C.P.R.§ 791]); see also 137 CONG. REc. Sl5,485 (daily ed.
Oct. 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy addressing relationship between the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and Title I of the ADA of 1990).
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in Title I of the ADA. 118 At the very least, some distinction would be
found in the language of the statute or in the legislative history between
employment discrimination and all other types of discrimination
actionable under Title II. Absent a distinction, however, the most
reasonable interpretation is that Congress intended the reference to section
505 of the Rehabilitation Act to be a reference to the remedial provisions
applicable to section 504 of that Act, rather than to section 501, even as
applied to employment discrimination claims. 119
Therefore, Congress' oblique reference in Title II's enforcement
provisions to the "rights, procedures and remedies set forth in section
505 of the Rehabilitation Act" appears to be based upon an assumption
that it would be clearly interpreted as a reference to the remedial
standards applicable to section 504, rather than section 501. Only if the
remedies under section 504, and accordingly Titles VI and IX, are
available under Title II for intentional discrimination based on disability,
will a private plaintiff be entitled to the "full panoply of remedies" that
Congress intended. 120

118. See42U.S.C. § 12117(Supp. IV1992). Thespecificlanguageofthisstatutereads
as follows:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures
this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this
chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning
employment.
ld.; see also supra note 20.
119. The regulations adopted by the Department of Justice further reflect that Title II
adopts Title I's substantive provisions, but not its remedial provisions. See 28 C.P.R.
§ 35.140(b)(l) (1993) (incorporating the substantive requirements of Title I established in 29
C.P.R. pt. 1630); 28 C.P.R.§ 35.172 app. A (1993) (incorporating language from committee
report providing for "full panoply of damages"); see also Petersen v. University of Wisconsin
Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1279-80 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (concluding that Department
of Justice regulations incorporated only substantive provisions of Title I as applied to Title II
employment discrimination claims, and said regulations were entitled to substantial weight in
light of ambiguity in Title II's enforcement statute).
120. The Department of Justice has confirmed this interpretation of Title II and its
regulations in an amicus brief recently tiled in a pending Title II case. See Memorandum of
the United States, Appearing as Amicus Curiae, in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
Livingston v. The Honorable Zoro J. Guice, Jr., (W.D.N.C.) (Civil No. 5:92CV131-MU).
Livingston involves a claim under Title II that the plaintiff was wrongly excluded from the first
degree murder trial of her nephew when the judge in the case refused to permit her to use the
only wheelchair accessible door to the courtroom. !d. at 3. In the amicus brief tiled by the
Department of Justice, the Department of Justice asserted that Title II was patterned on§ 504,
and should be construed to provide the same rights and remedies as those provided under
§ 504, Title VI, and Title IX. ld. at 5-6. The Department of Justice further argued that
Franklin's analysis applied "with equal force" to Title II claims, and that Congress intended
a private cause of action under this section with the "full panoply of remedies." Jd. at 9-13.
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It thus follows that the remedies analysis of Franklin applies to
claims brought under Title II. The established relationship between Title
II, section 504, Title VI, and Title IX directly supports application of the
Court's reasoning in Franklin to Title II and the conclusion that there is
a presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies under that statute. 121
Furthermore, there is no indication in the language of Title II nor its
legislative history that Congress intended to limit damages under that
statute so as to overcome such a presumption. 122 To the contrary,
Congress' reference to the "full panoply of remedies" appears to be an
endorsement of that broad remedial standard.
The case law interpreting Title II to date has not directly addressed
the issue of available recovery. The cases generally center on one aspect
of Title II enforcement, namely whether a private plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing a civil claim. 123 The reasoning
in these cases suggests that when squarely presented with this issue,
courts will apply section 504/Title VI remedies to Title II claims.
For example, in Petersen v. University of llisconsin Board of
Regents, 124 the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin accepted in dicta the proposition that Title II incorporates the
remedies, rights, and procedures of section 504 and Title VI. 125 The
court also reasoned that the regulations adopted by the Department of
Justice, which incorporate section 504 enforcement standards, were to be
given substantial weight because of the ambiguity in Title II's enforcement provisions. 126 The court then applied section 504 enforcement

121. Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 167 (D. Del. 1993).
122. /d. at 167-68.
123. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903, 907 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (applying
§ 504 enforcement standards to determine that Title II plaintiff was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies); Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 483 (N.D. Ind. 1993)
(same); Finley v. Giacobbe, 827 F. Supp. 215, 219 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Petersen v.
University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.O. Wis. 1993) (same).
124. 818 F. Supp. 1276 (W.O. Wis 1993).
125. /d. at 1278-79 n.l. The court in Petersen reasoned that Title II incorporates the
rights and remedies of the Rehabilitation Act which "does not require non-federal employees
to exhaust administrative remedies . . . . " /d. at 1278-79. The court then stated that the
Rehabilitation Act adopts the remedies, procedures and rights of Title VI. ld. at 1279 n.l.
This latter reference establishes that the court was referring to § 504 remedial standards
because § 504 is the section of the Rehabilitation Act which incorporates Title VI standards.
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
126. /d. at 1280. Similarly, the court in Noland reasoned as follows:
The language of the relevant enforcement provision, § 12133, admittedly is
ambiguous. In referring to§ 794a, § 12133 fails to distinguish between§ 794(a)(l)
and § 794(a)(2), each of which incorporates different rights, remedies, and
procedures . . . . In light of this ambiguity, the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Justice interpreting Title II of the ADA are entitled to controlling
weight.

258

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

standards to determine that Title II claimants were not required to exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing a private cause of action. 127
The reasoning in Petersen is representative of those cases which have
considered this issue. 128 Given this reliance on section 504 enforcement
standards in regard to exhaustion of remedies, courts will likely engage
in similar reasoning to conclude that Title II likewise incorporates section
504 remedies, which in turn incorporate the Title VI standard of "any
appropriate relief. " 129
III.

WHAT DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE AS "ANY APPROPRIATE
RELIEF" UNDER TITLE

II?

As much as Franklin answered regarding the scope of damages
available under Title IX and the related statutes, it left a great deal
unanswered. The plaintiff in Franklin alleged that she was entitled to
damages, but what specific type of damages she sought is not discussed
in the Supreme Court opinion. 130 The Court referred only to the fact
that the Court of Appeals found no right to "monetary" damages. 131
Later in the opinion, the Court reasoned that the equitable remedies of
"backpay and prospective relief' were not sufficient to afford Franklin

Noland, 835 F. Supp. at 483 (citations omitted).
127. Petersen, 818 F. Supp. at 1280. The court supported its conclusion regarding Title
II by referring to the regulations issued by the Department of Justice, which expressly reject
any requirement of exhaustion of remedies. Id. at 1279-80 (quoting 28 C.P.R. § 35.172 app.
A).

128. See, e.g., Noland, 835 F. Supp. at 483 (holding that plaintiff was not required to
exhaust administrative remedies because regulations adopted under Title II adopted § 504
standards and were to be given controlling weight); Ethridge v. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903,
907 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (reasoning that "even assuming that Title II's incorporation of the
remedies of the Rehabilitation Act does not settle the exhaustion question, the regulations
plainly state that exhaustion is not required.").
129. Another context in which this issue has arisen is in regard to whether violation of
Title II can be the basis for a civil rights action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 against the individuals
involved. See, e.g., Independent Hous. Servs. of San Francisco v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840
F. Supp. 1328, 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the ADA does not preclude a suit under
§ 1983); see also infra note 231. In the process of reaching its decision on the§ 1983 issue,
the court in Independent Housing Servs. reasoned that "[t]he parties have briefed the question
of whether a § 1983 claim may be based on a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Since the ADA incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in the Rehabilitation
Act, ... [this] briefing is applicable to the ADA claim." ld. at 1345. The court, therefore,
apparently presumed that the reference to the Rehabilitation Act in Title II, was in fact a
reference to § 504.
130. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1992). The
Eleventh Circuit opinion also does not reveal what specific types of damages the plaintiff in
Franklin sought. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617,618 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating only that plaintiff was "seeking damages" against the school district).
131. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65.
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a remedy. 132 The majority opinion, therefore, apparently presumed that
"monetary" damages meant something broader than equitable-type
remedies, but did not specifically state what this meant. 133
The regulations adopted by the Department of Justice to implement
Title II also do not specifically address the scope of what might be
considered "monetary damages" under Title II. 134 Nonetheless, some
general standards can be discerned from the existing statutes and case
law. As the following discussion reflects, a claimant under Title II
should be entitled to both pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensatory

132. See id. at 75-76. Backpay provided the plaintiff in Franklin no remedy because she
was a student rather than an employee of the district. ld. Prospective relief, such as an
injunction prohibiting the alleged harasser from handling future classes, was not effective
because the alleged harasser no longer taught at the school and the plaintiff herself no longer
attended that school. ld.
133. The plaintiff in Franklin was presumably seeking some type of compensatory relief
for pain and suffering and emotional distress, based on her allegation that she was sexually
harassed by her former teacher. A pre-Franklin case which also arose in the educational
context demonstrates how courts in these cases implicitly recognize the limited pecuniary relief
suffered by some discrimination claimants. See Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Bd., 917
F .2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff in Pfeiffer alleged sexual discrimination in her dismissal
from her high school chapter of the National Honor Society (NHS) after she became pregnant.
ld. at 782. Although the court in Pfeiffer did not specifically spell out what damages would
be considered "compensatory," the court's discussion of the factual context reflects that the
court did not intend to limit such damages to equitable-type remedies such as backpay.
Before reaching the issue of whether compensatory damages could be recovered under
Title IX, the court considered whether, in this case, the plaintiff could prove any monetary
losses:
There is also a serious question as to what monetary damages, if any, could be
available to [Pfeiffer], should the district court determine she was discriminated
against in violation of Title IX. Her dismissal from the NHS did not affect her status
or record as a student. She graduated with honors and with her class. She did not
apply for, or lose, any collegiate scholarships or awards because of her dismissal from
the NHS. She elected not to attend college for reasons having nothing to do with her
dismissal and has not been denied a job because she was dismissed from the NHS ...
. She has admitted that she knows of no one who holds her in disrepute because of
her dismissal from the NHS.
/d. at 786 (citation omitted). The court then stated that it was "[a]ssuming, but not deciding,
that some monetary damages could be calculated." /d. at 787. It appears from this discussion
of the plaintiff's damages in Pfeiffer that about the only damages left would be for pain and
suffering and mental distress.
134. The regulations simply refer to the language in the legislative history of Title II
which states that there is a private right of action under that statute which includes the "full
panoply of remedies" without specifically defining what this "full panoply" encompasses. See
28 C.P.R.§ 35.172 app. A (1993).
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damages, 135 as well as equitable relief1 36 and attorney's fees, 137 but
not punitive damages. 138

A.

Compensatory and Equitable Relief

"Monetary damages" should include, at the least, damages to
compensate for the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. In the context of
other federal civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S. C. § 1983, the Supreme
Court has recognized that general compensatory principles govern awards
of damages for injuries caused by a defendant's breach of duty. 139 The
question for courts should, therefore, center on what compensatory relief
is "appropriate."
"Appropriate" compensatory relief should include those damages
which the plaintiff can prove were actually caused by the defendant's
breach of duty under Title IJ.1 40 This should certainly include any
pecuniary losses such as medical expenses, transportation costs,
admission fees, licensing fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss
of professional opportunities. 141 It should also include noneconomic
losses such as damage to reputation, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of
life, mental anguish and distress, and pain and suffering. 142

135. See discussion infra part III.A.
136. See id.
137. See discussion infra part III.B.
138. See discussion infra part III.C.
139. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (reasoning that the "cardinal
principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the injury caused
plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty." (citation omitted)}.
140. Cj Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 (requiring proof of actual injury in order to recover
compensatory damages for mental anguish and distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974} (stating in the context of a claim for violation of
the fair housing provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3612) that
"[i]f a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to judgment
for that amount"); cj REsTATEMENT(SECOND} OF TORTS§ 912 (1979) ("One to whom another
has tortiously caused harm is entitled to compensatory damages for the harm if, but only if, he
establishes by proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate
compensation with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.").
141. Cj Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970, 973 (D. Colo. 1992)
(concluding that the plaintiff in § 504 claim could recover compensatory damages for, among
other things, loss of professional opportunity caused by plaintiff's firing). See generally
Pamela W. Kermie, Protecting Individuals from Sex Discrimination: Compensatory Relief
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,67 WASH. L. REV. 155, 169-72 (1992)
(outlining the types of compensatory damages which are appropriately awarded in Title IX
cases).
142. Cj Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 (concluding that emotional distress-type damages are
appropriate for violation of a federal statute when there is proof of the nature and circumstances
of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (lith
Cir. 1985) (approving award of compensatory damages under 42 U .S.C. § 1981 and § 1983
in the amount of $100,000 where plaintiff established emotional stress, loss of sleep, marital
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Many of these damages, including emotional distress and loss of
enjoyment of life, are enumerated as appropriate compensatory relief
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for violations of Title I. 143 Although the Civil Rights Act does not apply to Title II, it does illustrate
what Congress considered "compensatory" and suggests what Congress
may have had in mind when it referred to the "full panoply of damages."
Moreover, these damages should be awarded upon proof of loss,
regardless of whether equitable remedies are available. The Supreme
Court in Fran/din indicated that courts should determine the adequacy of
the remedies at law before resorting to equitable remedies. 144 Accordingly, even in those cases in which reinstatement injunctive relief might
provide some remedy, a court's first inquiry is whether there are
appropriate monetary damages which can be awarded. 145 Once appropriate monetary damages are determined, the court may then consider
whether additional equitable remedies would be appropriate, assuming
such remedies have been requested. 146

strain, and humiliation because of violation of his civil rights); Tanberg, 787 F. Supp. at 973
(concluding that plaintiff could recover mental anguish and pain and suffering he allegedly
experienced as a result of being fired for having the HIV virus); Kermie, supra note 141 , at
169-72. The Court in Franklin also likely had this type of dantages in mind when it expressed
its concern that the plaintiff would be "remediless." See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); see also supra note 133.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). Section l98la(b)(3) actually sets the
limitations on compensatory relief that can be recovered for violation of the covered statutes,
but in doing so it outlines a range of compensatory damages that can be awarded under
§ 198la(a)(2): "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." /d. Presumably, past
pecuniary losses would also be recoverable, although not subject to the damage caps.
144. Franklin, 503 U.S at 75-76 (reasoning that "[u]nder ordinary convention, the proper
inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and if not, whether
equitable relief would be appropriate").
145. See Tanberg, 787 F. Supp. at 973 (reasoning that the adequacy of compensatory
damages are considered first, but without limiting the plaintiff to compensatory damages); cf
Kraft v. Memorial Medical Ctr., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 785, 792 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (rejecting
defendant's argument in § 504 employment discrimination suitthatFranklin should be confined
to Title IX non-employment claims where equitable remedies provide no relief).
146. See Tanberg, 787 F. Supp. at 973 (court reasoned that although it would consider
monetary damages first, it was not limiting the plaintiff to "compensatory damages alone").
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 similarly provides that claimants, under the statutes subject to that
act, are entitled to compensatory damages in addition to any equitable relief already authorized
under existing statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV 1992). The statutes do
not state that compensatory relief is determined before equitable relief, but the language in
Franklin regarding "the ordinary convention" to consider remedies at law first would seem to
also apply to determining damages under§ 198la. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
This standard is also applied to racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992). See Sinai v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d
471, 476 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that damages awarded by jury were adequate to compensate
the plaintiff such that district court properly denied any additional equitable relief).
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Under this approach, backpay, as well as loss of future wages,
should be awarded as compensatory relief.
Although backpay is
expressly characterized under Title VII as an equitable remedy, 147 it is
awarded as a legal remedy under statutes such as 42 U.S.C. section 1981,
which prohibits discrimination in making and enforcing contracts, 148
and other statutes which the Supreme Court has found to provide a right
to recover compensatory damages, enforced through a private cause of
action. 149 At least one circuit, the Eleventh, has already concluded,
post-Franklin, that backpay claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act are compensatory damages at law, such that the plaintiff is entitled
to have these damages determined by a jury. 150

147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing award of backpay as
equitable remedy to enforce violation of Title VII). The Court in Franklin, in dicta, also
characterized backpay as an equitable remedy. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76 (rejecting
defendant's arguments that remedies under Title IX should be limited to equitable remedies).
148. See Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (lOth Cir. 1988)
(reasoning that back pay requested as part of plaintiff's compensatory claims in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 action was legal, rather than equitable, relief); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. IV 1992).
Interpretation of§ 1981 is subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which directs
the federal courts to use the laws of the United States to the extent those laws are "suitable to
carry the same into effect." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). If those laws are not "suitable,"
§ 1988 directs the courts to look to state common-law to the extent that the common-law is not
inconsistent with the Constitution nor the laws of the United States. Id. Likewise, under the
Franklin analysis, a court looks to the statutory law of the particular statute, and absent a
Congressional expression of the intent to limit remedies, the court may turn to the common law
to determine appropriate remedies. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 67, 70-71.
149. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,570
( 1990) (concluding that backpay is a legal remedy in actions brought for breach of duty of fair
representation and violation of§ 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S. C. § 185
(1988)); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974) (characterizing backpay as "compensatory" and "legal" remedy under § 812 of Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 3612)). In both Terry and Curtis, the Supreme Court distinguished Title VII's treatment of
backpay as equitable on the grounds that Congress specifically categorized backpay under that
statute as a form of "equitable relief." Terry, 494 U.S. at 572; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198. For
example, in Curtis, the court reasoned that "[i]n Title VII cases the courts of appeals have
characterized back pay as an integral part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution. But
the statutory language on which this characterization is based . . . contrasts sharply with
§ 812's simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive damages." ld. at 197.
Likewise, under Title II, there is a "simple authorization" of "any appropriate relief."
150. Waldrop v. Southern Co. Servs., 24 F.3d 152, 157 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on her claim for backpay under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act because backpay is a form of legal relief under that statute). The court in
Waldrop distinguished some courts' treatment of backpay under § 504 as a form of equitable
relief based on analogy to Title VII, on the grounds that "the remedy portions of the [two]
statutes are materially different. Title VII, as opposed to § 504 and Title VI from which the
§ 504 remedies are derived, (1) specifically defines what relief is available under the statute,
and (2) only refers to equitable relief." Id. at 158 n.IO (citation omitted}. The court then
concluded that backpay under § 504 could not be characterized as a form of equitable
restitution, because it was not awarded to "cure unjust enrichment of the defendant" nor to
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Some courts have also characterized the award of lost future wages,
or "frontpay," as an equitable remedy under Title VII, 151 although this
remedy is generally allowed only as an alternative to reinstatement when
hostility is too great to allow plaintiff to return to his or her prior job or
when an adequate position is not currently available. 152 Such awards
of frontpay under the equitable enforcement provisions of Title VII have
been criticized, however, because frontpay is not expressly authorized by
the language of that statute and is more in the nature of "a legal rather
than an equitable remedy. " 153
The claimant's ability to recover lost future wages under Title II
should not be contingent on the availability of reinstatement because,
according to Franklin, monetary remedies should be considered first. 154
Additionally, the awarding of equitable remedies is subject to the
discretion of the court, whereas legal remedies such as money damages
are awarded as a matter of right if the plaintiff establishes the cause of

"(restore] in kind a specific thing" that the plaintiff lost. /d. at 158-59. Rather, backpay was
"designed to compensate [the plaintiff] for an injury, the loss of her job." /d. at 159.
151. See, e.g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that award of frontpay may be awarded as equitable relief in Title VII claim in
discretion of the court); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has also issued guidelines indicating
that it will treat frontpay as an equitable remedy under both Title VII and Title I of the ADA,
and, therefore, not subject to that act's damages caps. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Decision No. 915.002, 1992 WL 189089, at *1, 4 (July 14, 1992) (FLB-EEOC).
152. See, e.g., Thome, 802 F.2d at 1137 (reasoning that frontpay is appropriate when it
is impossible to reinstate); cf Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461,
1469-70 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989) (noting in age discrimination action
that "[i]t has been held that front pay cannot be recovered unless plaintiff shows that
reinstatement is not feasible") (citation omitted). Section 2000e-5(g) provides that courts may
order reinstatement as well as backpay, but makes no express mention of frontpay. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Courts allowing frontpay see it as a necessary element to returning the
plaintiff to the status quo, which is one of the goals of Title VII. See Shore, 777 F.2d at 1160
(remanding case for determination if frontpay necessary to place plaintiff in position she would
have been but for the discriminatory acts).
153. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 117 (7th Cir. 1990); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (outlining equitable relief available under Title VII). The court in
McKnight stated that "the premise [of awarding frontpay under Title VII] can be doubted, as
can the propriety, under a statute confined to equitable relief, of an award of what is really
damages for lost future earnings-a legal rather than an equitable remedy." McKnight, 908
F.2d at 117.
154. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). That is not
to say that the plaintiff would not have a duty to reasonably mitigate any lost wages. See
Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1446 (recognizing that plaintiff cannot recover lost wages which could
have reasonably been avoided); cf REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918(1) (1979) ("[O]ne
injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could
have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.").
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action and actual loss. 155 Lost wages should, therefore, be handled
under Title II in the same manner as they are in section 1981 claims:
namely, they should be treated as part of the plaintiff's compensatory
damage remedies, awarded as a matter of right upon proof of actual loss
without regard to the availability of equitable relief. 156

B.

Attorney's Fees

The general provisions of the ADA provide that in any action
brought under the ADA the prevailing party, other than the United States,
can recover reasonable attorney's fees as well as litigation expenses and
costs. 157 Accordingly, there should be little question that the prevailing
party in a Title II action can recover attorney's fees. 158 The regulations
adopted by the Department of Justice also reflect that attorney's fees may
be awarded in actions under Title 11. 159

155. Cf Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). The Supreme Court in Curtis
reasoned that "[i]n Title VII cases ... the courts have relied on the fact that the decision
whether to award back pay is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. There is no
comparable discretion here: if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages,
he is entitled to judgment for that amount." !d.
156. See Skinner v. Total Petroleum Co., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding
that district court correctly submitted issues of backpay, lost benefits, and future wages to jury
as part of plaintiff's compensatory damage claim in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action).
As a practical matter, this issue may be of most concern in regard to whether the plaintiff
is entitled to a jury trial. See Waldrop v. Southern Co. Servs., 24 F.3d 152, 159 (lith Cir.
1994) (holding that trial court improperly denied plaintiff a jury trial on her backpay claims
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Sldnner, 859 F.2d at 1444 (concluding that backpay
claim was properly submitted to jury in action under § 1981 because it was in the nature of
legal reliet). The scope of any right to a jury trial under Title II of the ADA is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, if a jury trial is available for at least some types of damages
under Title II, it would certainly simplify matters if all damages could be submitted for
determination by that jury. Cf Sldnner, 859 F.2d at 1443-44 (outlining difficulty in allocating
fact-finding functions between court and jury when backpay is available as equitable relief
under one statute and monetary damages under another).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (Supp. IV 1992). This section provides as follows:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the
court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs,
and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.
!d.
158. In addition,§ 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act provides that the court may, in its
discretion, award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1988).
Unlike§ 794a(a), this provision establishes the same rule for actions brought under§ 501 or
§ 504, or any applicable provision of the Rehabilitation act. See id. There should, therefore,
be little doubt that this section also applies to Title II.
159. 28 C.P.R.§ 35.175 (1993) (providing that in any action or administrative proceeding
brought under Title II, the court or agency may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party
a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses and costs).
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Punitive Damages

Some commentators have suggested that Franklin's language is broad
enough to permit the award of punitive damages. 160 Indeed, there is no
implicit limit in the "any appropriate relief' standard which would
preclude punitive damages. 161 Nonetheless, although some limited
support for this proposition can be found in Congress' use of the term
"full panoply of remedies, " 162 punitive damages likely will not be
available for violations of Title II, for a number of reasons.
First, Franklin would have to be read as modifying the wellestablished rule in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 163 that
government entities are immune from punitive damages. 164 Second,
even in suits against private parties, the overwhelming weight of authority
at the time the ADA was passed was that punitive damages were per se
not available under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 165 Congress
was aware of this rule when considering passage of the ADA and did not

160. See Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias
in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 13, 86 (1992) ("Although Franklin
addressed compensatory damages, the Court's reasoning extends equally to the availability of
punitive damages"); Kelly S. Terry, Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools:
Reviving the Presumption ofRemedies Under Implied Rights ofAction, 46 ARK. L. REV. 715,
736 (1993) ("Franklin appears to make punitive damages available for implied rights of action
where Congress has not expressly indicated otherwise .... ");Ellen J. Vargyas, Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools and Its Impact on Title IX Enforcement, 19 J.C. & U.L. 373,
377 (1993) (Franklin "strongly" suggests punitive damages are available).
161. The Court in Franklin neither explicitly authorized nor ruled out an award of punitive
damages. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). In fact, the Court
did not at any point in its analysis refer to punitive damages. See id.
162. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; cf Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area
Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (D. Iowa 1984) (reasoning that "full panoply of
damages" under § 504 presumably includes punitive damages).
163. 453 u.s. 247 (1981).
164. Fact Concerts specifically held that municipalities are immune from punitive
damages. /d. at 271. This ruling has been extended to school boards, transportation districts,
and other arms of municipal government. See, e.g., Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v.
Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982) (municipal
water district); Okeson v. Tolley Sch. Dist. No. 25, 570 F. Supp. 408, 412 (D.N.D. 1983)
(school boards), rev'd on other grounds, 760 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1984); Ferguson v. Joliet
Mass Transit Dist., 526 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (public utility providing mass
transportation). State immunity has not been an issue because states are immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment for violations of§ 1983. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). Although states are not immune under
the ADA, the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision in Fact Concerts also supports
a conclusion that state governments and their agencies and instrumentalities are likewise
immune from punitive damages. See infra notes 168-89 and accompanying text.
165. See discussion infra part III.C.l.
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clearly express an intent to modify it under Title 11. 166 Third, the
problems inherent in imposing punitive damages against a municipality
on a case-by-case basis argue against anything other than a per se
prohibition. 167

1.

Fact Concerts and municipality immunity from punitive damages

Eleven years prior to Franklin, the Supreme Court in City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. held that municipal governments are
immune from claims for punitive damages. 168 The Supreme Court
concluded that the history of nonavailability of punitive damages against
municipalities, combined with public policy concerns about allowing such
damages, precluded exposing municipalities to punitive damages. 169
Although Fact Concerts specifically involved a claim brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983/70 the Court's analysis applies with equal force to
punitive damage claims against government entities under Title II, even
after Franklin. 171
The Supreme Court in Fact Concerts first looked to common-law
principles which existed at the time the precursor of section 1983 was
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 172 At that time,

166. See id. Congress did modify the rule in regard to violations of Title I of the ADA,
but expressly excluded government entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l) and discussion of
this statute infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
167. See discussion infra part III.C.3.
168. 453 u.s. 247 (1981).
169. ld. at271; see also Leev. Wyandotte County, Kansas, 586 F. Supp. 236, 240 (D.
Kan. 1984) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Fact Concerts was based not only on
consideration of the nature and purpose of the statute involved, § 1983, but also upon
consideration of the nature and purpose of punitive danlages themselves).
170. Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proposed proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The precursor to§ 1983 was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which was enacted to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See H.R.
320, 42d Cong., lst Sess. § l, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
171. Fact Concerts has been extended to civil rights claims brought under other federal
statutes, including§§ 1981 and 1985. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205,
1270-71 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that punitive dan!ages are not recoverable from a
municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985); Lee, 586 F. Supp. at 240
(holding that county is immune from punitive damages under §§ 1981 and 1985 under Supreme
Court's analysis in Fact Concerts).
172. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 258; see also supra note 170. The Court reasoned in
Fact Concerts that an "important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is
that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles ... and that they
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common law treated municipalities like natural persons, subject to suit for
a wide range of activities. 173 This did not extend, however, to the
award of punitive damages. 174 Courts at that time were virtually
unanimous in stating that no punitive damages could be awarded against
municipalities. 175
Municipalities were seen as appropriately protected from punitive
damages because "such awards would burden the very taxpayers and
citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. " 176
Compensation was an obligation properly shared by the municipality, but
punitive obligations were properly borne by the wrongdoer himself or
herself. 177
The Court then considered the legislative history of section 1983
within the context of this prevailing rule. 178 Given that municipal
immunity from punitive damages was well established in the common law
at the time the statute was enacted, the Court "proceed[ed] on the familiar
presumption that Congress would have specifically so provided if it had
wished to abolish this doctrine. " 179 The Court found no such language
in either the statute or the legislative history. 180
The Court then turned to the current state of the law to determine if
the common-law rule should be abolished. 181 The Court ultimately
concluded that public policy concerns about allowing such damages
against municipal governments continued to militate against this form of
relief. 182

likely intended that these common-law principles obtain, absent specific provisions to the
contrary." Fact Concerns, 453 U.S. at 258.
173. /d. at 259-60.
174. /d.
175. /d.
176. /d. at 263.
177. /d.
178. /d.
179. ld. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)); see also supra note 172.
180. Fact Concerns, 453 U.S. at 263-64. The Court noted that there was little debate
regarding § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. /d. at 264. Instead, the Court looked to the
debate concerning what was labelled the Sherman amendment, which would have imposed
liability on any inhabitant of a municipality for damages inflicted by persons "riotously and
tumultuously assembled." /d. at 264 n.24. This amendment was rejected by Congress, in
large part over concerns that it would place an unmanageable burden on local governments and
unfairly punish innocent taxpayers. /d. at 265-66. The Court reasoned that "Congress'
opposition to punishing innocent taxpayers and bankrupting local governments [in conjunction
with the Sherman amendment] would [not] have been less applicable with regard to the novel
specter of punitive damages against municipalities." /d. at 266. For a more extensive
discussion of the Sherman amendment and the general legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-95 (1978).
181. Fact Concens, 453 U.S. at 266.
182. /d. at 271.
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The Court reiterated that an award of punitive damages against a
municipality '"punishes' only the taxpayer, who took no part in the
commission of the tort. " 183 The Court was skeptical that punitive
damages would serve their intended objective of deterring future
misconduct if the municipality were required to pay, rather than the
official who committed the wrongful act. 184 The Court was further
concerned about the unlimited discretion of a jury when presented with
financial information relevant to the punitive damage award, such as the
unlimited taxing ability of a municipality. 185 The court concluded that:
[t]he impact of such a windfull recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and, at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible
strain on local treasuries and therefore on services available to the
public at large. Absent a compelling reason for approving such an
award, not present here, we deem it unwise to inflict the risk. 186

This forceful rejection of punitive damages against a municipality
strongly suggests that the Supreme Court might continue to uphold the
common-law immunity of municipalities, even after Franldin. 181
Franklin permits the courts to award "any appropriate relief," but the
Court has already concluded in Fact Concerts that punitive damages are
not "appropriate" when the defendant is a government entity. Nothing
in Franklin indicates that the Court was contemplating a change in this

183. /d. at 267. The Court characterized punitive damages as a "windfall" to the plaintiff
who is otherwise appropriately compensated for his or her losses due to the official misconduct.
/d.

184. /d. at 268-69; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(1)(1977) (purpose
of punitive damages is to "punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future."). This concern about imposing
punitive liability on the individual wrongdoer has not seen consistent application, even in those
courts which have applied Fact Concerts and ruled that municipalities are immune from
punitive damages. For example, in Kolar v. County of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1985), the court, while giving lip service to Fact Concerts, ruled that the defendant county had
waived its immunity via a statute which directed local governments to indemnify employees
acting within the scope of their employment for "any tort judgment or settlement." /d. at 567.
This despite the fact that the statute in question did not expressly provide for indemnification
of punitive damages. But see Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 481 (3rd Cir.
1992) (Higginbotham, Jr., J., dissenting in part) (criticizing "legal fiction" created when courts
find government entities immune from punitive damages but then impose such liability through
application of indemnification statutes).
185. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 270-71. The Court was concerned that information about
the unlimited taxing ability of a municipality might lead a jury to make "a sizeable award."
/d. at 270.
186. /d. at 270-71 (footnote omitted).
187. Lower courts have concluded that Fact Concerts' rationale applies to other federal
discrimination statutes such as§ 1981 and § 1985. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1984)(findingpunitivedamages not recoverable under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1985); see also supra note 164.
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rule. The same concerns raised in Fact Concerts arise in this context-namely, that punitive damages are effective, if at all, only when
they punish the actual wrongdoers, and such deterrence is not present
when a municipality must pay through its taxing power, imposing a
burden on taxpayers which may be both undue and unwarranted. 188
Nevertheless, because the Court in Fact Concerts recognized the
importance of both the prevailing common-law rule at the time the
legislation was enacted, as well as Congress' ability to change that
rule, 189 an inquiry must be made whether this rule has been modified
in the context of subsequent legislation. Accordingly, the next issue is
what the prevailing rule was regarding punitive damages under the
Rehabilitation Act and related statutes at the time that the ADA was
enacted, and whether Congress evidenced any intent to change that rule.
2. Did Congress indicate an intent in Title II to change the prevailing
rule of no punitive damages under federal disability discrimination
laws?

At the time that the ADA was passed, there was a consensus among
the lower courts that punitive damages were not available in any action
under section 504. 190 While some courts based their rulings on the
premise that only equitable remedies were available for violation of
section 504, 191 an analysis clearly called into question by Franklin, 192

188. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266-67. The Court's concern regarding the effect
evidence of the municipalities taxing power may have on the jury, encouraging "sizeable"
punitive damages awards has less weight. See id. at 270. Juries generally contain taxpayers,
who know about fiscal consequences of large awards. Cf Jeffery V. Strahan, Note,
Torts-Municipal Liability-Exemplary Damages Available Against Municipality Perjonning
Proprietary Function if Willfol or Malicious Conduct Directly Attributable to City Official(s),
City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S. W2d 514 (Tex. 1987), 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 773,786 (1988)
(suggesting that in the context of state law authorizing punitive damages against government
entities, juries presumably composed of taxpayers are arbiters which can invoke punitive
damages effectively and with appropriate discretion when deterrence is necessary).
189. See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 939 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding punitive damages not recoverable under § 504); Cortes v. Board of Governors, 766
F. Supp. 623,626 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same); Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp.
(ADAPT), Salt Lake Chapter v. SkywestAirlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320,325 (D. Utah 1991)
(holding punitive damages "clearly" not available under § 504); Gelman v. Department of
Educ., 544 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D. Colo. 1982) (finding no case law which authorized award
of punitive damages under§ 504); But see Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency,
589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (punitive damages "presumably" available under
§ 504).
191. See, e.g., Eastman, 939 F.2d at 209 (rejecting punitive damage remedies under the
Rehabilitation Act because court found no Congressional intent to authorize any damages of
a "non-equitable" nature); Doe v. Southeastern Univ., 732 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1990)
(rejecting claims for both compensatory and punitive damages because the Rehabilitation Act
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other courts separately analyzed the two types of damages and concluded
that compensatory damages were available but punitive damages were
not. 193
One reason advanced for denying punitive damages under statutes
such as section 504 is that deterrence is properly accomplished by the use
of administrative termination of federal funding. 194 This rationale
would, of course, not apply to entities which do not receive federal funds
and are not subject to these administrative remedies. 195 Therefore, this
reasoning has limited relevance to statutes such as Title II, which does
not premise liability on compliance with federal funding mandates.
A more pertinent and appropriate rationale is that punitive damages
are not "necessary," or appropriate, relief under section 504. 196 One
court reasoned as follows:
In determining whether punitive damages are available under § 504, it
is well to keep in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that courts

authorizes only equitable relief).
192. See Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 572 n.14 (D.D.C. 1992)
(questioning reasoning of cases such as Doe v. Southeastern Univ. in light of the Court's
decision in Franklin).
193. See Cortes, 766 F. Supp. at 626; Gelman, 544 F. Supp. at 654; see also Glanz v.
Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding decision to allow punitive damage
claim to abate with death of plaintiff while allowing compensatory damage claim to survive
"not inconsistent" with purposes and procedures of the Rehabilitation Act).
194. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 45. Franklin rejected this rationale as a reason to limit
compensatory relief. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(rejecting government's argument that administrative action would help other similarly-situated
students, because such an argument would provide the petitioner no remedy).
195. Cf Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (refusing to apply Title VII analysis by analogy
to Title IX claim on the grounds that Title VII is an outright prohibition of discrimination
whereas Title IX is based on the conditional grant of federal funding).
In fact, a converse argument might be advanced in favor of allowing punitive damages
against entities which do receive federal funding. Those entities would not necessarily need
to resort to local taxpayer funds to pay a punitive damage award. There is, however, no
guarantee that such awards would not exceed the amount of funds received. Whereas this is
true even of compensatory awards, the difference between a compensatory recovery, designed
to compensate for actual losses, and a punitive recovery, which is based on the concept of
punishing and deterring the actual wrongdoer, justifies potentially taking taxpayer funds for the
former but not for the latter. This is implicit in the reasoning of Fact Concerts. See City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981) (suggesting that allowing imposition of
compensatory remedies against municipality may prompt taxpayers to take action to remove
wrongdoer).
196. See Cortes, 766 F. Supp. at 626; Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 45. This analysis should
be distinguished from that in which a court, having decided that punitive damages can be
awarded, determines that they are not necessary or appropriate in that particular case. Cf
Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Iowa 1984)
(holding that although punitive damages are presumably available under § 504, they were not
justified in that case).
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must "be responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire
to keep § 504 within manageable bounds." Although Congress was
silent on the availability of compensatory damages under § 504, such
damages are arguably necessary to accomplish the statutory objectives.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are not necessary to "make good
the wrong," when plaintiff is already being allowed to seek front pay,
back pay, compensatory damages and even reinstatement. There is
insufficient reason to imply a punitive damage remedy when Congress
has given no indication whatsoever that it intended to authorize such
relief. Therefore, this court concludes that punitive damages are not
available under § 504. 197

This analysis of "necessary" relief is consistent with the Supreme
Court's concept of "any appropriate relief" under Franklin. 198 One of
the Court's concerns in Franklin was that without compensatory damages,
the plaintiff would be left "remediless. " 199 Once the plaintiff is
compensated for actual loss, punitive damages are not necessary in order
to afford a remedy. Rather, punitive damages are, in effect, a windfall
to that particular plaintiff. 200 Franklin does not suggest that the Court
would approve a rule that goes any farther than assuring adequate
compensation for the injured party.
Additionally, there is no indication in the enforcement provisions of
Title II that Congress intended to allow punitive damages. 201 Although
the legislative history of Title II reflects Congressional intent to permit
the "full panoply of damages," this must be taken in context. Congress
intended Title II to be enforced "like section 504. " 202 Congress must
be presumed to have been aware of the overwhelming agreement among

197. Cortes, 766 F. Supp. at 626 (citations omitted).
198. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71; see also Terry, supra note 160, at 739 n.103 (noting that
whether punitive damages can be recovered under ADA will depend on whether courts find the
remedy "appropriate").
199. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. The Court in Franklin reasoned that under Title IX,
a statute that prohibits discrimination in education, the traditional equitable remedies ofbackpay
and prospective relief were clearly inadequate. /d. As a student, plaintiff would not be entitled
to backpay. /d. Because the teacher who allegedly harassed her was no longer employed by
the school, prospective relief such as an injunction, provided the plaintiff with no remedy at
all. [d.
200. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 45 (concluding it is unlikely Congress intended§ 504 to
provide a "windfall" to plaintiffs in the form of punitive damages); see also City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (reasoning that "punitive damages imposed on a
municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff.").
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (Supp. IV 1992).
202. See supra note 112.
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the lower courts that no punitive damages were available under section
504. 203

The only place where Congress expressly addressed punitive damages
in conjunction with the ADA is in the damage provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. In that act, Congress modified the rule prohibiting
punitive damages, but only in regard to claims brought under Title I of
the ADA against non-government defendants. 204 This limitation on
punitive damages was apparently considered so unremarkable that
Congress felt it only necessary to note it as a parenthetical in the text of
the statute. 205
There is one provision in the general provisions of the ADA,
applicable to all titles of the act, which might arguably indicate an
intention to permit punitive damages, at least in regard to state defendants. 206 This provision makes state liability coextensive with that of
other defendants:
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any
action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter,
remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available
for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies pre available
for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity
other than a State. m

203. Cf Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 258 (applying an assumption that Congress was
familiar with common-law principles in existence at the time that the statute was enacted and
intended those principles to apply absent provisions to the contrary). This same reasoning was
implicit in Franklin as well. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-72 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)) (reasoning that to determine whether
Congress intended to limit presumption in favor of "any appropriate remedy," court must look
to state of law at the time Title IX was enacted}.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l}. This section provides that:
(a] complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if
the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
/d.

205. See supra note 204. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reflects
that Congress intended to adopt the remedial standards of §§ 1981 and 1983 for punitive
damages. See H.R. REP. No. 40(11}, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 722 (quoting Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) in
support of the proposition that the standard for punitive damages in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was taken directly from civil rights case law).
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (Supp. IV 1992).
207. /d. (emphasis added). The language of§ 12202 is essentially identical to the Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, which the Supreme Court
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A literal translation of this language might suggest state government
liability for punitive damages under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
if non-state defendants would have such liability. 208 As previously
discussed, however, the prevailing rule at the time the ADA was passed
was that such damages were not available against any defendant, public
or private. 209
There is nothing in the legislative history of this section that suggests
Congress intended to do anything more with this provision than abrogate
state Eleventh Amendment immunity. 210 The amendment to Title I
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reinforces this conclusion by its
general prohibition of punitive damages against "a government,
government agency or political subdivision" without recognizing any
distinction between state and local governments. 211 If Congress had
intended the abrogation of state immunity under the ADA to be an
authorization of punitive damages against state governments, its
subsequent amendment of Title I remedies would presumably have
reflected such intent.
Beyond that, the rationale that taxpayers are unfairly burdened with
punitive damage claims applies with equal force to state defendants.
States, like municipalities, would potentially face payment of large
punitive damage claims out of funds obtained through its taxing

found significant in Franklin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1988); see also supra notes 6872 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Franklin, concluded that
Congress implicitly acknowledged that damages are available under Title IX by including in
this statute the provision that "remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are
available for [violations of Title IX] to the same extent as such remedies are available for such
a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State." Franklin, 503
U.S. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2)).
208. Section 12202 would not have any effect on municipal liability, because it expressly
applies only to states. 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Supp. IV 1992). The Supreme Court has held that
municipalities and other local government entities are not "states" for purposes of Eleventh
Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (holding local school board is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
209. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
210. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 138 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,421 (stating only that§ 503 (42 U.S.C. § 12202) abrogates State Eleventh
Amendment immunity and was included to comply with the standards set by the Supreme Court
in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)). So far, courts have considered
§ 12202 only for the basic proposition that it abrogates state immunity from suit. See Martin
v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that ADA unequivocally indicates
Congressional intent to abrogate state immunity under Eleventh Amendment, without discussion
of damage remedies in particular).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1992).
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powers. 212 Congress cannot be presumed to have acted in disregard of
such longstanding concerns, without having specifically stated its
intention to do so. 213

3. Should there be a case-by-case approach to punitive damages,
rather than a per se prohibition?
Fact Concerts establishes a per se rule that municipalities are immune
from liability for punitive damages, absent some expression of Congressional intent to permit such damages. 214 Even assuming such intent is
not found, the Court's decision does not entirely foreclose the possibility
of a case-by-case determination of municipal liability for punitive
damages in some limited circumstances. The Court's reasoning suggests
it would consider a "compelling reason" for approving such an
award. 215 The majority opinion contains a footnote that suggests one
such reason may involve "an extreme situation where the taxpayers are
directly responsible for perpetuating an outrageous abuse of constitutional
rights. " 216
There may also be situations in which the nature of the discriminatory act may cause only limited compensable damage. 217 Without the

212. Taxpayers would face the prospect of higher taxes, as well as possible curtailment
of offered services, whether the defendant is the state or a local government. Cf City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (reasoning that award of punitive
damages against municipality are likely accompanied by a tax increase or reduction in public
services); Ferguson v. Joliet Mass Transit Dist., 526 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(rejecting an argument that Fact Concerts rule should not apply to a water district which did
not have its own taxing power because it received financial support from a local sales tax as
well as state funds, which raised the specter of increased taxes and curtailed services).
213. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 258.
214. ld. at 271.
215. ld. (concluding that "absent a compelling reason for approving such an award, not
present here," the Court would not impose liability for punitive damages on a municipality).
216. ld. at 267 n.29. This footnote provides as follows:
It is perhaps possible to imagine an extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly
responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights. Nothing of
that kind is presented by this case. Moreover, such an occurrence is sufficiently
unlikely that we need not anticipate it here.
ld. Courts which have considered this footnote have consistently concluded that the cases
before them did not warrant imposition of punitive damages. See, e.g., Korotki v. Goughan,
597 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 & n.46 (D. Md. 1984) (noting that no court after Fact Concerts has
found a situation which called for application offootnote 29); see also Wade v. Cicero, lllinois,
571 F. Supp. 157, 159 (N.D. 111. 1983) (suggesting that only a referendum in which voters
overwhelmingly mandated an unconstitutional action would be sufficient to meet the taxpayer
involvement exception).
217. One area in which this may arise is the program accessibility provisions of Title II.
See generally supra note 16. Conceivably, access might be denied to a government program
which does have a significant pecuniary impact on the victim, such as some of the recreational
activities sponsored by cities and counties. This assumes that the victim of the discrimination
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addition of punitive damages in such cases, it may be argued, there would
be little incentive for the individuals involved to change the discriminatory policy or activity. A per se prohibition against awarding punitive
damages might, therefore, result in a failure to serve the interests
protected by the federal legislation, particularly when such action is taken
pursuant to official government policy. 218
Thus, it could be argued that a case-by-case determination of the
appropriateness of punitive damages should instead be allowed. 219 At
least one state supreme court has in recent years adopted such a
standard. 220 This standard, as adopted in Texas, requires the plaintiff
to meet a two-pronged test for the appropriateness of punitive damages:
As a general rule a municipality may not be liable for exemplary
damages; however, if a plaintiff can show that there is intentional,
willful, or grossly negligent conduct which shows an entire want of care
to his rights and that such conduct can be imputed directly to the
governing body of the municipality, exemplary damages may be
recovered. 221

can show only limited non-pecuniary damages for such things as distress and mental anguish.
218. Cf Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 273 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
when a violation of federal civil rights law is committed in accordance with official government
policy, it is perfectly reasonable to impose punitive damage on the citizens who elected those
officials, and are ultimately responsible for them). This scenario also raises questions of
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the full implications ofwhicharebeyond the scope
of this Article. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)
(local governments may be liable under § 1983 when the alleged act is taken in accordance with
government policy, practice or custom); see also infra note 232 for a brief discussion of
liability of individual government employees or officials under § 1983 for violations of federal
discrimination statutes.
219. The type of per se prohibition adopted in Fact Concerts has been criticized by some
members of the Court in other contexts. See International Bhd. ofElec. Workers v. Foust, 442
U.S. 42 (1979). In Foust, the Court ruled that unions were immune from punitive damage
claims in suits alleging the union's breach of the duty of fair representation in failing to
properly pursue a member's grievance. /d. at 52. The dissent in Foust criticized this per se
rule, finding no prohibition in the law for such damages and concluding that punitive damages
in the "exceptional case will serve at least to deter egregious union conduct." ld. at 60-61
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result); see also Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 273 n.2 (Brennan,
J. , dissenting).
220. In City ofGiadewaterv. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514,519 (Tex. 1987) the Texas Supreme
Court held that punitive, or exemplary, damages could be recovered from a municipality
performing proprietary, as opposed to governmental, functions. In reaching its decision, the
court in Pike reasoned that while "[i]t is true that only a few cases have recognized that the
municipality will be liable [for punitive damages] ... it seems that many of the results were
due not to the law, but rather to the facts." ld. at 521.
221. ld. at 522. The second prong of this test appears to adopt a standard similar to that
adopted by the Supreme Court in Monell for general local government liability under 42 U.S. C.
§ 1983. See Monell v. Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding that a local
government is not liable under § 1983 unless the alleged action "implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
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This two-pronged test arguably responds to the concerns raised by
the Supreme Court in Fact Concerts, namely effective deterrence and
avoiding unwarranted burdens on taxpayers. Because policy-making
officials must be directly linked to the wrongdoing, deterrence occurs
through the fear of association to the malfeasance, which presumably
carries the threat of not being reelected. 222 Unwarranted burdens on the
public would be avoided by the high standard of improper conduct which
the plaintiff must show. 223 As the Texas Supreme Court concluded,
"By requiring a plaintiff to show both wanton, malicious, or grossly
negligent behavior and actual imputation to the city leaders, [this rule]
will limit recovery to only those exceedingly few situations where the
actions of persons in authority show utter disdain for the protection of the
citizens' rights. " 224
Even this standard, however, does not adequately address concerns
about the effect of punitive damage awards on public entities performing

body's officers," or is taken pursuant to "governmental 'custom' even though such a custom
has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels."). As
such, it is broader than the exception to the no punitive damages rule suggested in footnote 29
of Fact Concerts, which would require taxpayer participation. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S.
at 267 n.29; see also supra note 216 discussing this footnote and the lower courts'
interpretations of it.
The Texas Supreme Court did not rely on the Supreme Court's analysis in Monell, nor did
it refer to footnote 29 in Fact Concerts. Rather, the court's standard was synthesized from
prior Texas cases, in which the court found a willingness to impose punitive damages if there
was a "showing of concurrence in, or ratification of, the acts of the municipal officers by the
governing body .... " Pike, 727 S.W.2d at 522 (quoting San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett
Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 279-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
222. See Strahan, supra note 188, at 785.
223. /d. It is further suggested that juries presumably composed of taxpayers are arbiters
which can invoke punitive damages effectively and with appropriate discretion when deterrence
is necessary. /d.
224. Pike, 727 S.W.2d at 524. The court in Pike further stated that "[t]he proper facts
have never arisen in this State, and there is no certainty that they ever will." Id.
The Pike standard is also expressly limited to government entities performing proprietary
functions, as opposed to governmental functions. See Pike, 727 S.W.2d at 519 (citing TEX.
av. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 101.024). A proprietary function is one intended primarily
for the advantage and benefit of the inhabitants of the municipal corporation rather than the
general public. ld. In Texas, the government undertakings that constitute government
functions are specifically enumerated by statute. See TEX. CN. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.0215 (Vernon Supp. 1994). The Texas legislature added this statute after the decision
of the Texas Supreme Court in Pike, to expand the definition of governmental functions in
order to severely limit the situations in which the Pike rule would apply. See Strahan, supra
note 188, at 787-88. This raises the question of whether certain government functions subject
to coverage under Title II and related statutes would be proper for punitive damages and others
not. However, unlike state laws such as that found in Texas, there is no similar "proprietary
versus government function" counterpart in Title II or related statutes, which could be used to
make such a determination.

235]

INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE II

277

public services. 225 This standard would potentially allow a large
punitive damage award for a single act of discrimination against a single
claimant. 226 In such a case, the service, program, or activity may be
rendering a benefit to its intended class, a benefit which is nondiscriminatory on the whole. Nonetheless, funding for that service, program, or
activity would be diverted to pay the damage award, thereby threatening
the benefit. 227 Clearly, a large compensatory damage award could have
the same result, but the sense of justice that is involved in compensating
an individual for actual loss tempers the harshness in this context. 228
Another problem is determining when punishment for the acts of an
official are appropriately vested upon the taxpaying public. This

225. The Pike standard also cannot be reconciled with Fact Concerts, which was decided
after the Supreme Court decided in Monell that acts taken pursuant to government policy or
custom can be the basis of local government liability under§ 1983. See supra note 221. The
Supreme Court's decision in Fact Concerts can be seen as a rejection of the Monell standard
as being inadequate to safeguard local government interests. Instead, Fact Concerts allows a
case-by-case consideration of punitive damage claims.
226. A recent example of just how large punitive damage awards can be in comparison
to the amount of compensatory damages is found in EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,
823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993), one of the first cases litigated under Title I of the ADA.
In AIC Sec., the jury, in addition to $50,000 in compensatory damages, awarded $250,000 in
punitive damages against each of two defendants for the wrongful discharge of a plaintiff who
developed terminal brain cancer. Id. at 572. The court found that the total amount of punitive
damages, $500,000, was ten times the amount of compensatory damages and clearly excessive.
ld. at 579. The court then reduced the amount to $150,000, the total available under the
damage caps established in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), and held both defendants jointly and
severally liable for this amount. ld. at 579-80. If the case had been litigated under Title II,
the damage caps would not have applied.
227. A related issue is that those entities which offer certain services, programs, or
activities primarily because they are subsidized by the federal government, in effect, voluntarily
assumed federal liability under the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, or similar statutes. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 17 (characterizing
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power to be in the nature of a contract,
whose obligations a State may voluntarily and knowingly accept). To some extent, this federal
money cushioned the effect of any liability imposed on the entities. See also supra note 72.
With the advent of the ADA and, in particular, Title II, liability is no longer conditional
on the receipt of funds. If the entity is a "public entity" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1),
the entity shoulders this liability, whatever its limits. State court systems are a good example
of the type of institution whose necessary services may be significantly affected by the
mandates of Title II, without the cushion of federal funding. For two such examples, see supra
note 13 discussing the Kroll case, in which the county was required to tear down and rebuild
government buildings and find a means to pay for this work or face imposition of a special
sales tax by the federal district court, and note 120 discussing the Guice case, in which the
Department of Justice has asserted that a state court is potentially liable for a broad range of
damages in a claim involving an alleged failure to make a courtroom accessible to an individual
in a wheelchair.
228. The Supreme Court in Fact Concerts implicitly recognized that compensatory awards
have an impact on municipal resources, but apparently saw this as justified. See City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (suggesting that impact of compensatory
awards on fiscal condition of municipality may induce public to vote wrongdoers out of office).
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approach raises questions regarding what involvement the taxpaying
public must have with the offending official or policy, and whether it is
fair to impose punitive sanctions on that portion of the public which voted
against the official or policy or, for that matter, failed to vote at all. 229
Even the Texas Supreme Court reflected some skepticism that, under its
case-by-case approach, an appropriate case for imposing punitive
damages on a municipality would ever arise. 230
Rather than focusing on punitive damage liability of a government
entity, a better approach may be to impose this liability on the individual
wrongdoer. The ability to impose liability on the individual wrongdoer
was an important factor in the Supreme Court's analysis in Fact
Concerts. 231 Unfortunately, the parameters of any personal liability of
the individual wrongdoer for violation of Title II, or other related federal
civil rights laws, is beyond the scope of this Article. 232 In summary

229. Cf Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d I (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982) (questioning the feasibility of creating some type
of "taxpayer involvement" exception to the Fact Concerts rule). The First Circuit's reasoning
in Heritage Homes, a case involving claims against a municipal water district alleged to have
committed racial discrimination in its decision to exclude a housing development from the
district, illustrates the problems inherent in allowing a case-by-case evaluation of punitive
damage claims against a municipality. See Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. The court
reasoned that while there was overwhelming evidence of racial motivations in the discussions
prior to the vote, only a small number of voters attended the meeting. !d. The court further
reasoned that if punitive damages could be recovered, "[t]he actions of a small claque of voters
would burden several thousand non-participants, many of whom presumably were unaware of
the entire controversy." ld. The court concluded that a "compelling showing" was required
that those who did not attend the meeting knew there was a serious threat of the discriminatory
actions, which would compel them to either vote or stay away at their peril. ld. The court
also concluded that there was little chance that the small number of voters who allegedly acted
in a discriminatory manner would be deterred by the knowledge that several thousand other
taxpayers would be sharing any punitive damage award imposed on the municipality for their
actions. ld.; see also Wade v. Cicero, Illinois, 571 F. Supp. 157, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(suggesting that only a referendum in which the voters overwhelmingly mandated an
unconstitutional action would be sufficient to meet the taxpayer involvement exception).
230. City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 524 (Tex. 1987).
231. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 269-70 (observing that "[b]y allowing juries and courts
to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending official, based
on his personal financial resources, [§ 1983] directly advances the public's interest in
preventing repeated constitutional deprivations"); cf Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp. , 824
F. Supp. 769, 785-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (expressing concern that "if [supervisory employees]
who make discriminatory decisions do not have to pay for them, they may never alter their
illegal behavior and the wrongdoers may elude punishment entirely, while the victim may
receive no compensation whatsoever").
232. Title II itself most likely does not permit individual liability on the part of the
employees which commit the discriminatory acts. The definition of a "public entity" under
Title II contains no reference that would encompass individual employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (Supp. IV 1992) (defining "public entity" to include only governmental units,
agencies, and instrumentalities); cf id. § 12111(2) (defining "employer" under Title I to
include agents of the employer); id. § 2000e(b) (1988) (defining "employer" under Title VII
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then, it is unlikely that punitive damage liability will be imposed on
governmental units unless Congress takes affirmative steps to do so.
IV.

SIMILAR CONDUCf, SIMILAR SUBSTANTIVE RULES, DIFFERENT
RECOVERY

Congress has made some attempt in recent years to equalize the
remedies available for similar acts of discrimination. This was, in fact,
the impetus behind the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 233 Because a compromise led to the inclusion of the damages caps in that act, however,
Congress' actions were less than successful. 234 The ADA is an additional example of the disparity that still exists in remedies afforded for
intentional discrimination. 235 In the case of the ADA, this disparity

to also include agents of employer); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding that supervisory employee can be held personally liable under Title VII if
supervisory employee participated in the decision-making process that formed the basis of the
discrimination).
There may be an alternate route for finding individuals liable for Title II violations:
namely, via an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that violations
of certain federal statutory rights are actionable under § 1983. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
I (1980). The Court has also determined that the individuals committing these acts may be
held liable for both compensatory and punitive damages. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974) (finding that individual defendant could properly be held liable for
monetary damages for violation of§ 1983); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding
that individual defendant in§ 1983 claim may be liable for punitive damages when that party's
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others). This raises a number of other issues,
including the impact of good faith immunity, and whether the remedial devices in Title II are
sufficiently comprehensive so as to evidence Congress' intent to preclude suits under§ 1983.
See Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that Title II did not
demonstrate an intent to preclude enforcement under§ 1983). A more thorough consideration
of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article and will await further development
elsewhere.
233. See H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st. Sess., at 65, (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603. For additional discussion of this issue, see infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
234. The original intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the compromise which led
to the inclusion of the damages caps is discussed in more detail infra notes 253-54 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the damages caps themselves, see supra notes 48-50
and accompanying text.
235. This disparity would have been avoided, but for another compromise. The original
version of Title I contained an enforcement provision which would have permitted a broad
scope of remedies:
The remedies and procedures set forth in sections 706, 709, and 710 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9), and the remedies and
procedures available under section 1981 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981)
shall be available, with respect to any individual who believes that he or she is being
or about to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any
provisions of this Act, or regulations promulgated under section 204, concerning
employment.
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exists for exactly the same type of discrimination, subject to the same or
similar substantive rules, within the same federal act.
As the foregoing discussion establishes, remedies under Title II of
the ADA vary from those available under Title I and Title III. 236 If
each title addressed a dissimilar type of discrimination, this disparity
might be justified. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In regard to Title
I and Title II in particular, the same act of intentional discrimination,
subject to identical substantive rules, may result in one party being made
whole and another party not.
Because Title II incorporates the substantive rules and regulations of
Title I for claims of employment discrimination based upon disability, 237 an act of employment discrimination which violates Title II will
necessarily also violate Title I. Despite this fact, the amount a particular
plaintiff can recover under these two titles may not necessarily be the
same because the two titles look in different directions to find their
remedies. The following hypothetical illustrates this anomaly:
Jane is a clerk in a county court in the State of New Sweden. Jane
also has cerebral palsy. For a number of years, she clerked for a
particular judge, who has now retired. The two of them had no
difficulty working together, and Jane was able to do her job with some
limited accommodation.
After that judge retired, Jane was assigned to Judge Smith. Judge
Smith did not prove willing to work with Jane, and often expressed his
displeasure out loud and in the presence of others. For instance, on

H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., § 205 (1990). Under§ 1981 standards, a claimant would have been
entitled to the full range of compensatory relief. See, e.g., Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, 728
F.2d 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding award to plaintiff that included compensatory
relief for out-of-pocket losses, and emotional distress and mental suffering).
The original enforcement provision was changed in order to obtain passage of the ADA,
to include only those equitable remedies allowed at that time under Title VII. See H.R. REP.
No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 88 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,506
(outlining negotiations between Senate and Bush Administration which led to compromise on
damages in Title I in exchange for broadening the pub! ic accommodation provisions under Title
III of the ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 which
provides for equitable remedies only). When this version of the statute was passed, Congress
was already considering new civil rights legislation to amend the enforcement provisions of
Title VII to allow compensatory relief, which the supporters of the original version of Title I
apparently believed would accomplish their goal by providing for broader remedies. SeeS.
2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Civil Rights Act of 1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 485(III), !Olst Cong., 2d Sess., at 89 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 507 (stating objection to proposed attempt to broaden
Title I remedies through amendment of Title VII and urging amendment of the ADA to "delink" Title I remedies from Title VII remedies so as to clearly retain limited equitable relief).
236. For a discussion of Title I remedies, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Title III remedies, see supra note 26.
237. See supra note 17.
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more than one occasion he told Jane that her physical condition
distracted courtroom participants and prevented others from getting their
own work done. On other occasions, he made extremely disparaging
comments about her physical appearance, including one time while they
were in the middle of a court session. Despite Jane's requests that the
judge stop this behavior, he persisted. The judge also filed evaluations
highly critical of her work, and Jane was eventually dismissed from her
job. She has been unable to find new employment, in large part
because of the negative outcome of her last job.
Jane sues the county for violation of Titles I and II of the ADA.
Her case is tried, and a verdict is returned which includes compensatory
damages in the amount of $500,000, not including backpay and
pecuniary losses to the date of trial.

Under Title II, Jane is entitled to recover the full $500,000. Title II
permits recovery of compensatory damages, which in this case should
encompass such things as loss of future wages and benefits, 238 any
impairment to her earning capacity, mental anguish and humiliation,
damage to reputation, and any out-of-pocket expenses, past or future. 239
Under Title I, however, Jane's recovery is limited. As an initial
matter, the county would be subject to liability under Title I only if it has
fifteen or more employees. 240 This is probably not a problem when a
county is the public entity in question, but it may be an issue with smaller
political subdivisions in rural areas. 241
Assuming this threshold is met, Jane could at most recover $300,000
of the compensatory damages she was awarded because Title I is subject
to the $300,000 liability limit set forth in the Civil Rights Act of
1991. 242 Furthermore, the $300,000 cap only applies if the county has

238. For a discussion regarding why loss of wages should be characterized as a
component of compensatory damages under Title II, rather than equitable relief, see supra
notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
239. Jane should also be entitled to backpay (whether characterized as equitable or
compensatory relief), reinstatement, and attorney's fees, but not punitive damages. See supra
part III.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (Supp. IV 1992). Iftheclaimarosebeforetheeffectivedate
of Title I, July 26, 1992, there would be no liability under Title I at all. See id. If the claim
arose after that date but before July 26, 1992, the threshold number of employees would be
twenty-five. See id.; see also supra note 17.
241. There would be no liability under Title I, but Title II has no size limitation. In
contrast, if this scenario had played out in a private office, and there were fewer than fifteen
employees, there would be no federal liability for discrimination based on disability unless this
business happened to be a recipient of federal financial assistance.
242. Because the only pecuniary losses to which the caps apply are future pecuniary
losses, the caps would not limit recovery of out-of-pocket losses such as medical or counselling
expenses incurred prior to judgment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). The caps
also do not limit other forms of equitable relief otherwise authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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500 or more employees. 243 If the county has fewer employees, the caps
drop in stages, to a low of $50,000 for an employer with more that
fourteen but fewer than 101 employees. 244
In any situation involving a public entity, the plaintiff will likely
choose to pursue the claim under Title II because the substantive rules are
the same but recovery is not capped. If the defendant is not a public
entity, however, the ADA plaintiff does not have this choice. 245 If Jane
had sued a private company for the exact same acts of discrimination, her
recovery would be limited by the damage caps. In fact, her recovery
would likely be subject to the lowest damage tier of $50,000 because the
vast majority of private business in the United States have 100 or fewer
employees. 246

A.

Victims of Intentional Discrimination Stand in the Same Shoes

Differing remedies under the various civil rights statutes are not new.
For example, courts have held that there is no inherent problem with
awarding broader remedies against an individual defendant in actions
brought under other federal civil rights statutes, such as sections 1981
and 1983, than would be available for the same violation under Title
VII. 247 However, other courts have stated that civil rights statutes

g(5), which means that if the court deems frontpay to be a form of equitable relief under Title
I, this may increase the total amount Jane could recover, assuming that reinstatement was not
available. ld. § 1981(a)(2); see supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text regarding treatment
of frontpay as an alternative to reinstatement.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
244. These caps would also limit recovery if Jane sued a private employer and was
awarded punitive damages. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571,
577 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that amount of punitive damages must be reduced so that, when
added to amount of compensatory damages, the total award does not exceed the appropriate cap
for the number of employees employed by the defendant).
245. If the entity is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the plaintiff could pursue
a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, and have the same range of remedies as the Title II
plaintiff. These remedies would not be available in claims against "the 'mainstream' of
society," which is likely to be involved in disability discrimination claims that fall under Title
I of the ADA. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at90 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S. C. C.A.N. at 508 (asserting that although federal agencies and recipients of federal
funds have been covered by laws prohibiting disability discrimination since 1973, "the
'mainstream' of society" has had no such experience).
246. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(observing that ninety-eight percent of all businesses fall within the lowest damage tier in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Office of Advocacy, United States Small Business
Administration, Handbook ofSmall Business Data 27 (1988) (table listing non-farm enterprises
by employment size, listing employers with less than 100 employees as representing ninetyeight to ninety-nine percent of all businesses surveyed).
247. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (reasoning
in dicta that an individual who brings claim under Title VII is not deprived of other remedies
he possesses and is not limited to Title VII relief); see also Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d
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protecting similar interests should provide similar remedies. 248 For
example, this theme is found in the decisions of those courts which, prior
to Franklin, determined the scope of remedies under section 504 and Title
VI by analogizing to the remedies available under Title VII. 249
When it passed the ADA, Congress clearly indicated its intent that
the act be construed in a manner consistent with other existing discrimination laws. 250
Although there are some substantive differences
between Title II and other anti-discrimination statutes, these statutes are
modeled after each other251 and frequently overlap in the categories of

1431, 1435 (II th Cir. 1985) (approving award of compensatory damages for emotional distress
and mental suffering in intentional racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983, in addition to the award of backpay under joined Title VII claim); Harris v. Richards
Mfg., 675 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (concluding that private plaintiff can bring action
under both Title VII and 42 U .S.C. § 1981 for racial discrimination and is entitled to equitable
relief under Title VII and equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages under § 1981 );
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
plaintiff could recover punitive damages in racial discrimination claim brought under 42 U.S. C.
§ 1981 despite fact claim was joined with Title VII claim in which such damages were not
available). Compensatory and punitive damages may now be awarded under Title VII for
intentional discrimination, except punitive damages cannot be awarded against government
defendants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(l), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
248. See Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 939 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 1991)
(reasoning that the considerable overlap in the type of discrimination prohibited by Titles VI
and VII "militates in favor of a basic congruity of remedies"); Turner v. First Hosp. Corp. of
Norfolk, 772 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E. D. Va. 1991) (quoting Eastman); see also Rivera Flores
v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 68-71 (D. Puerto Rico 1991) (comparing remedies
under §§ 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title I of the ADA, and concluding that
these statutes should be construed to provide consistent remedies).
249. See Eastman, 939 F.2d at 208; Turner, 722 F. Supp. at 287; Shuttleworth v.
Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35, 37 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (directing that "nothing in [the ADA]
shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title."); id. § 12201(b) (directing that "[n]othing in this chapter shall
be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or
law of any State or political subdivision ... that provides greater or equal protection for the
rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter."). Congress was also
explicit in stating that one of the purposes of the ADA was "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address th~ major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people
with disabilities."). /d. § 1210l(b). It has been suggested that this language was intended to
mandate a heightened level of judicial scrutiny in cases of discrimination on the basis of
disability, which would place individuals with disabilities on par with other groups already
protected by a form of heightened scrutiny. See Rains, supra note 33, at 199-202; see also
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1985) (reasoning that
mental retardation is nota quasi-suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis,
and therefore, not a classification entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny).
251. See supra notes 6-18, 56 and accompanying text.
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persons covered and conduct prohibited. 252 The victims of intentional
discrimination under these statutes stand in the same shoes-they have
been intentionally deprived of a federally protected right by a party acting
with a discriminatory motive. 253
When Congress was considering the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
House initially justified the addition of compensatory and punitive damage
remedies under Title VII by outlining how intentional gender and
religious discrimination have the same manifestations and harms as racial
discrimination, which was already subject to these broad remedies under
42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Gender and religious discrimination may have different cultural or
historic origins than racial discrimination. However, it does not follow
that Congress should differentiate among them for purposes of the
remedial scheme provided by fuderal law for intentional discrimination.
The manifestations of these various forms of intentional employment
discrimination are the same: loss of employment opportunities;
disparities in wages, employee benefits, and other forms of compensation; imposition of unequal working conditions; and harassment.
Moreover, the harms women and religious and racial minorities suffer
as a consequence of the various types of intentional discrimination are
the same: humiliation; loss of dignity; psychological (and sometimes
physical) injury; resulting medical expenses; damage to the victim's
professional reputation and career; loss of all forms of compensation
and other consequential injuries. 254

252. For a discussion of the overlap between Title VI and Title VII, both of which
prohibit racial discrimination, see supra note 90 and accompanying text. Some other examples
include the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, both of which prohibit disability discrimination,
as discussed in the first part of this Article, and Title VII and Title IX, both of which prohibit
sexual discrimination, including sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as form of sexual discrimination under
Title VII); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (recognizing sexual
harassment as form of sexual discrimination under Title IX and applying the standard set out
in Meritor).
253. The basic theme that runs through the jurisprudence of intentional discrimination is
that the defendant has treated individuals Jess favorably because of a characteristic or
characteristics protected by federal law, based on a discriminatory motive. See, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.l5 (1977) (describing
general theory of disparate treatment discrimination in the context of a Title VII claim); Prewitt
v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.J9 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
"Title VII jurisprudence is ... for the most part applicable to intentional social-bias
discrimination against handicapped persons"); cf Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (reasoning that the
duty not to intentionally discriminate on the basis of sex, specifically the duty not to sexually
harass, is "unquestionable" under Title IX, by analogy to Title VII standards).
254. H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d cong., 1st Sess., at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603. The report begins this discussion by stating that there is "an unfair
preference in federal civil rights law" because current Jaw permits unlimited compensatory and
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Despite the recogmt10n that vtcttms of intentional discrimination
suffer similar harms, the legislation that was eventually passed by
Congress and signed by the President added damages caps for not only
gender and religious discrimination, but for disability discrimination
under Title I as well. 255 In doing so, the Civil Rights Act not only
perpetuated the preferential remedies for racial discrimination as opposed
to gender and religious discrimination, but also created the disparate
remedies between Title I and Title II for the exact same type of discrimination.256
B. Status As a Public Entity Should Not Support the Disparity in
Amount Which Can Be Recovered for Intentional Discrimination

The question then becomes whether there is a justification for
treating entities differently under each title of the ADA. In some
contexts, the status of the defendant might justify a different recovery,
even if the substantive rules are similar. For example, in comparing
Titles II and III, there is arguably a greater public interest in making sure
that government entities operate in a manner accessible to all citizens,

punitive damages for racial discrimination but only equitable relief for gender and religious
discrimination. ld. The report further states that
Where the manifestations of prohibited conduct are the same, and the harms caused
are the same, the remedies should be the same as well. Gender and religious discrimination are as reprehensible as race discrimination, and should be treated the same for
purposes of making victims whole, encouraging private enforcement, and deterring
future violations of federal law.
/d.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 198Ia(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). The initial version of the 1991
legislation would have amended 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(g) directly to provide that compensatory
and punitive damages may be awarded without limitations based on the size of the employer.
H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 206 (1991). The Bush Administration proposed an
alternative version of the bill which included damage caps in the amount of $150,000 for all
claims of intentional discrimination under Title VII and Title I of the ADA. S. 611, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 8 (1991). The version eventually passed, S. 1745, represented a
compromise whereby the damages provisions were added as a separate subsection and
contained caps on the amount of damages based on the number of employees of the defendant
entity, up to a maximum amount of $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); see also 137
CONG. REc. S15,472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (outlining the
compromise on the damages provisions). Because the legislative reports are based on H.R. 1,
they reflect the discussion of the need to equalize damages but do not explain how this goal is
accomplished by the inclusion of damage caps. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note
254. For more information on the compromise process that led to the final version of the act,
see Linda Urbanik, Comment, Executive Veto, Compromise, and Judicial ConfUsion: The 1991
Civil Rights Act-Does It Apply Retroactively?, 24 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 109 (1992).
256. A similar disparity exists between Title II and Title III remedies, despite their
substantive overlap. For a brief discussion of this overlap, see supra note 16.
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which would justify the fact that Title II allows compensatory damages
in a private cause of action but Title III does not. 257
Even that rationale, however, fails to be persuasive. The types of
entities covered by Title III are largely similar to public entities in the
general public importance of the services they offer. For example, the
places of public accommodation covered by Title III, such as establishments serving food and drink, places of public gathering, hospitals,
shopping centers, museums, and private schools, are appropriately
considered "quasi-public entities" because the services they provide are
used and relied upon by a broad segment of the community. 258 The
public interest in ensuring operation of these entities in a manner
accessible to all citizens is certainly strong.
In regard to Title I, the argument runs in reverse. Public employment is not something of such broad public concern that it warrants
allowing broad remedies against a public entity but not private employers.
The general public has at least as great an interest in ensuring equal
treatment in private employment as in public employment, if not greater,
given the number of people employed in the private sector. Furthermore,
both groups of employees experience the same manifestations of harm
which Congress recognized are suffered by victims of intentional
employment discrimination. 259
The only difference between these entities is that one kind is
supported by taxpayer funds and the other kind is not. However, the
distinction of taxpayer funding, if anything, calls for restraint in the
exposure to damage remedies. 260 Despite the Supreme Court's view
that public entities have "unlimited taxing power, " 261 the reality is that
these entities regularly face funding cutbacks and attempts to increase tax
revenues to fund even basic services are met with strong protest.

257. See supra note 26 regarding the remedial provisions of Title III. A similar argument
might be made that this public interest justifies limiting remedies in suits against employers
subject to jurisdiction only under Title I, because they are neither public entities nor recipients
of federal financial assistance.
258. Of course, to the extent that these public accommodations receive federal financial
assistance, they would be subject to the Rehabilitation Act, which requires that programs,
services and activities be accessible to individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S. C. § 794. This
creates another situation where the same conduct is subject to similar substantive rules, but
differing remedies. See Mayberry v. von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Mich. 1994)
(denying a claim for monetary damages under Title III in private cause of action for failure to
meet accessibility requirements, but permitting same claim under § 504).
259. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
260. For a discussion of reasons for restraint in permitting remedies against public entities,
see supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text discussing the difficulties inherent in awarding
punitive damages against public entities on a case-by-case basis.
261. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981).
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What is perhaps most troubling about this anomaly is that nothing in
the legislative record of the ADA or in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
suggests that Congress recognized or considered this difference. The
original version of Title I would have permitted uncapped compensatory
and punitive damages, similar to those available for racial discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. 262 This would have resulted in similar
remedies under Titles I and II. However, when this provision presented
a roadblock to passage of the ADA, Congress compromised by deferring
to Title VII remedies. 263
This compromise was fueled in part by the fact that Congress was
already considering a new Civil Rights Act which would also have
equated the remedies available under Title VII with those available under
42 U.S.C. section 1981. 264 Unfortunately, this also ran into roadblocks, which ultimately led Congress to agree to the damage caps. 265
There is no evidence that during this process Congress revisited Title II
and considered the fact that it was creating two different remedial
standards for disability discrimination and employment discrimination,
based on disability in particular. 266 As a result, rather than fulfilling
its goal of equalizing remedies for acts of discrimination which result in
similar harms, Congress only added to the patchwork remedial scheme.
To some limited extent, consistency in remedies for intentional
discrimination can be accomplished by following Congress' directive to
interpret Title II consistent with section 504, which is in turn interpreted
consistent with Titles VI and IX. 267 However, this only solves the
problem among those three statutes. It does not resolve the disparity that
exists for claims of disability discrimination within the ADA.
One potential solution to this convoluted situation would be to pass
new legislation lifting the caps on damages established by the Civil Rights

262. See supra note 234.
263. !d.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988); S. 2104, IOlstCong., 2dSess. (1990); H.R. 4000, IO!st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also supra note 235. S. 2104 was passed by Congress but was
vetoed by President Bush. Veto-2104, Message from the President of the United States
Returning Without My ApprovalS. 2104, The Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. Doc. No. 35, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
265. See supra note 255.
266. The same is true for the disparity created with Title III. The entire focus of the
ADA debate appears to have been on the effect the new legislation would have on Title I. See,
e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S14,589 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(outlining Title I provisions affected by Civil Rights Act of 1991).
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (Supp. IV 1992) (directing that regulations adopted under
Title II be consistent with regulations adopted under Rehabilitation Act); U. § 1220 I (directing
that construction of the ADA be consistent with and not be construed to apply any lesser
standards than applicable under the Rehabilitation Act or any other state or federal law
providing "greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities.").
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Act of 1991. Such legislation has, in fact, been introduced in Congress,
the first versions of which were introduced soon after passage of the Civil
Rights Act in 1991. 268 Unfortunately, this proposed legislation, and the
subsequent versions which were re-introduced in the current session of
Congress and were still pending at the time this Article was prepared,
have failed to make significant headway. 269
Even if this legislation is passed, however, it would only strike the
language in 42 U.S.C. section 1981a which establishes the damages caps
for employment discrimination claims. 270 Such an approach simply lays
the groundwork for future confusion because it neglects those claims that
do not arise out of the employment relationship.
In order for this legislation to be entirely effective, it must expressly
provide that in any cause of action for intentional discrimination based
upon violation of a federal anti-discrimination statute, "any appropriate
relief' may be awarded. "Any appropriate relief' would include, but not
be limited to, compensatory damages and equitable remedies. 271 The
legislation should further specifically provide that it applies to all current
and future federal anti-discrimination statutes which provide either an
express or implied cause of action for intentional discrimination. Only
if Congress has specifically provided otherwise in the existing legislation
or specifically spells out the available remedies in any subsequently
enacted legislation would this rule not apply.
This would, however, not resolve the disparity between Title II and
Title III. Congress should revisit this area and adopt conforming
standards. Intentional discrimination under Title III should be treated in
268. SeeS. 2062, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Equal Remedies Act introduced by Sen.
Kennedy); H.R. 3975, l02d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (House version introduced by Rep.
Kennelly); S. 2677, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., § 501 (1992) (Economic Equity Act introduced by
Sen. Cranston, with provisions to remove damages caps under Civil Rights Act of 1991 ). Even
as the compromise version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was being debated, a number of
legislators announced that they would be submitting legislation designed to remove the damage
caps. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S15,488 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen's Brown
and Kennedy); ld. S15,496 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
269. See supra note 268. Three bills were pending before the Senate in 1993-1994. See
S. 17, 103d Cong., 1stSess. (1993) (Equal Remedies Act introduced by Sen. Kennedy similar
to 1991 version); H.R. 224, 103d Con g., 1st Sess. (1993) (Equal Remedies Act introduced by
Rep. Kennelly similar to 1991 version); H.R. 2790, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 102 (1993)
(Economic Equity Act introduced by Rep. Schroeder with provisions to remove damages caps
under Civil Rights Act of 1991). None of the 1993 versions apparently made it out of
committee. At the time this Article was being readied for publication, Sen. Kennedy and Rep.
Kennelly had recently reintroduced their bills before the 104th Congress. SeeS. 296, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 95, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp V. 1993); see, e.g., S. 296, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2
(1995).
271. Punitive damages should be limited, however, to parties other than the federal, state,
or local governments, for reasons set out in part III of this Article.
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the same way as intentional discrimination under any other disability
discrimination law, in order to provide appropriate compensation. 272
V.

CoNCLUSION

The prohibition of discrimination based on disability under Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act should ultimately reach most of
the day-to-day activities of state and local governments in this country.
Along with this broad prohibition comes a broad range of remedies for
victims of intentional discrimination. The overriding principle is that
victims of intentional discrimination should be fully compensated for the
losses they sustain. Although the enforcement provisions of Title II are
ambiguous on the surface, the legislative history combined with the
Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the expansive remedial powers of
federal courts273 should be interpreted to provide victims of intentional
discrimination with the right to the full range of compensatory and
equitable relief.
As a result, Title II provides the most expansive remedies of any of
the three substantive titles of the ADA. Due to unequal remedies under
each of those titles, Congress has perpetuated unequal treatment of acts
of discrimination which have similar manifestations and harms. This is
not only inequitable for the victims of discrimination, but it also places
an unequal burden on the entities ultimately charged with implementing
the ADA through compliance with its mandates. The "any appropriate
relief' standard which is applicable under Title II should at the very least
be applied with consistency under each of the titles of the ADA. Despite
the act's laudable goals, until Congress takes the final step of bringing all
of the disparate remedial standards for intentional discrimination into
conformity with one another, the ADA will stand as a prime example of

272. Cj Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,75-76 (1992) (distinguishing unintentional and intentional discrimination and the remedies available for each in part on
the grounds that entities "unquestionably" have notice of their duty not to intentionally
discriminate). Even the smallest of businesses have been subject to Title III enforcement since
at least January, 1993. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.508 (1993) (setting out the effective dates of Title
III and provisions for delaying enforcement of that title for businesses with fewer than twentyfive employees and less than $1,000,000 in gross receipts until January 26, 1992, and for
businesses with fewer than ten employees and less than $500,000 in receipts until January 26,
1993). All businesses have, therefore, had time to know their obligations under Title III.
There are already substantive safeguards built into Title III to address the needs of small
businesses. See Burgdorf, supra note 16, at 577-80 (discussing substantive standards such as
undue burden which are deferential to the needs of small businesses). Providing a consistent
right to compensation to those who can prove intentional failure to comply with even these
deferential standards would not be an unreasonable burden.
273. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76.
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the consequences of Congress' patchwork approach to the protection of
victims of discrimination.

